

**INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS**  
**INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

ICDR Case No. 01 – 14 - 0001 – 5004

In the matter of an Independent Review  
Concerning ICANN Board Action re  
Determination of the Board Governance Committee  
Reconsideration Requests 14-30, 14-32, 14-33 (24 July 2014)

DOT REGISTRY, LLC, for itself and on behalf of The NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF  
SECRETARIES OF STATE

Claimant

And

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN),

Respondent

**DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL**

29 July 2016

The Honorable Charles N. Brower

Mark Kantor

M. Scott Donahey, Chair

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)

1. ICANN is a nonprofit public-benefit corporation organized under the laws of the State of California. ICANN was incorporated on September 30, 1998. Jon Postel, a computer scientist at that time at the University of Southern California, and Esther Dyson, an entrepreneur and philanthropist, were the two most prominent organizers and founders. Postel had been involved in the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network ("ARPANET"), which morphed into the Internet. The ARPANET was a project of the United States Department of Defense and was initially intended to provide a secure means of communication for the chain of command during emergency situations when normal means of communication were unavailable or deemed insecure.

2. Prior to ICANN's creation, there existed seven generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs), which were intended for specific uses on the Internet: *.com*, which has become the gTLD with the largest number of domain name registrations, was intended for commercial use; *.org*, intended for the use of non-commercial organizations; *.net*, intended for the use of network related entities; *.edu*, intended for United States higher education institutions; *.int*, established for international organizations; *.gov*, intended for domain name registrations for arms of the United States federal

government and for state governmental entities; and, finally, *.mil*, designed for the use of the United States military.

3. ICANN's "mission," as set out in its bylaws, is "to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems." Bylaws, Art. 1, § 1. ICANN has fulfilled this function under a contract with the United States Department of Commerce.

4. The original ICANN Board of Directors was self-selected by those active in the formation and functioning of the fledgling Internet. ICANN's bylaws provide that its Board of Directors shall have 16 voting members and four non-voting liaisons. Bylaws, Art. VI, § 1. ICANN has no shareholders. Subsequent Boards of Directors have been selected by a Nominating Committee, as provided in Art. VII of the Bylaws.

5. ICANN gradually began to introduce a select number of new gTLDs, such as *.biz* and *.blog*. In 2005, the ICANN Board of Directors began considering the invitation to the general public to operate new gTLDs of its own creation. In 2008, the Board of Directors adopted 19 specific Generic Name Supporting Organization (GNSO) recommendations for the implementation of a new gTLD programs. In 2011 the Board approved the Applicant Guidebook and the launch of a new gTLD program. The application window opened on January 12, 2012, and ICANN immediately began receiving applications.

B. Board Governance Committee (BGC)

6. The Board Governance Committee was created by Charter, approved by the ICANN Board of Directors on October 13, 2012. Among its responsibilities is to consider and respond to reconsideration requests submitted to the Board pursuant to ICANN's Bylaws and to work closely with the Chair and Vice Chair of the Board and with ICANN's CEO. Charter, Sections 1.6 and 2.6, and 2.1.3. At the hearing of this matter, and consistent with the position taken by ICANN before other Independent Review Panels, counsel for ICANN confirmed that the conduct of the BGC was the conduct of the Board for purposes of these proceedings.

7. The BGC is composed of at least three, but not more than 6 voting Board Directors and not more than 2 Liaison Directors, as determined and appointed annually by the Board. Only the voting Board of Directors members shall be voting members of the BGC. Charter, Section 3.

8. A preliminary report with respect to actions taken at each BGC meeting, whether telephonic or in-person, shall be recorded and distributed to BGC members within two working days, and meeting minutes are to be posted promptly following their approval by the BGC. Charter, Section 6. No such preliminary report was produced to the Panel in these proceedings.

C. Dot Registry LLC (Dot Registry)

9. Dot Registry is a limited liability company registered under the laws of the State of Kansas. Dot Registry was formed in 2011 in order to apply to ICANN for the rights to operate five new gTLD strings: *.corp*, *.inc*, *.llc*, *.llp*, and *.ltd*. Dot Registry applied to be the only community applicant for the new gTLD strings *.inc*, *.llc*, and *.llp*. Dot Registry submitted each of its three applications for listed strings on 13 June 2012. Dot Registry submitted these applications for itself and on behalf of the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS). Dot Registry is an affiliate of the NASS, which is “an organization which acts as a medium for the exchange of information between states and fosters cooperation in the development of public policy, and is working to develop individual relationships with each Secretary of State’s office in order to ensure our continued commitment to honor and respect the authorities of each state.” New gTLD Application Submitted to ICANN by: Dot Registry LLC, String: INC, Originally Posted: 13 June 2012, Application ID: 1-880-35979, Exhibit C-007, Para. 20(b), p. 14 Of 66. For ease of reading, this Declaration shall refer to “Dot Registry” as the disputing party, but the Panel recognizes that Dot Registry and the NASS jointly made the Reconsideration Requests at issue in these proceedings.

10. The mission/purpose stated in its respective applications for the three strings was “to build confidence, trust, reliance and loyalty for consumers and business owners alike by creating a dedicated gTLD to specifically

serve the respective communities of “registered corporations,” “registered limited liability companies,” and/or “registered limited liability partnerships.” Under Dot Registry’s proposal, a registrant would have to demonstrate that it has registered to do business with the Secretary of State of one of the United States in the form corresponding to the gTLD (corporation for *.inc*, limited liability company for *.llc*, and limited liability partnership for *.llp*.)

11. With each of its community applications, Dot Registry deposited an additional \$22,000, so as to be given the opportunity to participate in a Community Priority Evaluation (“CPE”). A community application that passes a CPE is given priority for the gTLD string that has successfully passed, and that gTLD string is removed from the string contention set into which all applications that are identical or confusingly similar for that string are placed. The successful community CPE applicant is awarded that string, unless there are more than one successful community applicant for the same string, in which case the successful applicants would be placed into a contention set.

D. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)

12. The EIU describes itself as “the business information arm of the Economist Group, publisher of the Economist.” “The EIU continuously assesses political, economic, and business conditions in more than 200 countries. As the world’s leading provider of country intelligence, the EIU

helps executives, governments and institutions by providing timely, reliable and impartial analysis.” Community Priority Evaluation Panel and Its Processes, at 1.

13. The EIU responded to a request for proposals received from ICANN to undertake to act as a Community Priority Panel. The task of a Community Priority Panel is to review and score community based applications which have elected the community priority evaluation based on information provided in the application plus other relevant information available (such as public information regarding the community represented).” Applicant Guidebook (“AGB”), § 4.2.3. The AGB sets out specific Criteria and Guidelines which a Community Priority Panel is to follow in performing its evaluation. *Id.*

14. Upon its selection by ICANN, the EIU negotiated a services contract with ICANN whereby the EIU undertook to perform Community Priority Evaluations (CPEs) for new gTLD applicants. Declaration of <sup>EIU Contact Information Redacted</sup>  
EIU Contact Information Redacted of the EIU  
(hereinafter <sup>EIU Contact Information Redacted</sup> Declaration”), ¶¶ 1 and 4, at 1 and 2.

15. <sup>EIU Contact Information Redacted</sup> declared that EIU was “not a gTLD decision-maker but simply a consultant to ICANN.” “The parties agreed that EIU, while performing its contracted functions, would operate largely in the background, and that ICANN would be solely responsible for all legal matters pertaining to the application process.” <sup>EIU Contact Information Redacted</sup> Declaration, ¶ 3,



at 2. Further, ICANN confirmed at the hearing that ICANN “accepts” the CPE recommendations from the EIU, a statement reiterated in the Minutes for the BGC meeting considering the subject Reconsideration Requests: “Staff briefed the BGC regarding Dot Registry, LLC’s (‘Requestor’s’) request seeking reconsideration of the Community Priority Evaluation (‘CPE’) Panel’s Reports, and ICANN’s acceptance of those Reports.” (Emphasis added.)

16. Under its contract with ICANN, the EIU agreed to a Statement of Work. Statement of Work No:[2], ICANN New gTLD Program, Application Evaluation Services – Community Priority Evaluation and Geographic Names, March 12<sup>th</sup> 2012 (“EIU SoW”). Under Section 10, Terms and Conditions, supplemental terms were added to the Master Agreement between the parties. Among those terms are the following:

“(ii) ICANN will be free in its complete discretion to decide whether to follow [EIU’s] determination and to issue a decision on that basis or not;

(iii) ICANN will be solely responsible to applicants and other interested parties for the decisions it decides to issue and the [EIU] shall have no responsibility nor liability to ICANN for any decision issued by ICANN except to the extent the [EIU’s] evaluation and recommendation of a relevant application constitutes willful misconduct or is fraudulent, negligent or in breach of any of {EIU’s} obligations under this SoW;

(iv) each decision and all associated materials must be issued by ICANN in its own name only, without any reference to the [EIU] unless agreed in writing in advance.” EIU SoW, at 14.

17. In order to qualify to provide dedicated services to a defined community, an applicant must undergo an evaluation of its qualifications to serve such community, the criteria for which are set out in the Community Priority Evaluation Guidelines (“CPE Guidelines”). The CPE Guidelines were developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (“EIU”) under contract with ICANN. According to the EIU, “[t]he CPE Guidelines are intended to increase transparency, fairness and predictability around the assessment process.” CPE Guidelines Prepared by the EIU, Version 2.0 (“CPE Guidelines”), at 2. In the CPE Guidelines, the EIU states that “the evaluation process will respect the principles of fairness, transparency, avoiding potential conflicts of interest, and non-discrimination. Consistency of approach in scoring Applications will be of particular importance.” CPE Guidelines, at 22.

18. This message was reiterated in the EIU Community Priority Evaluation Panel and its Processes, where it states that the CPE process “respects the principles of fairness, transparency avoidance of potential conflicts of interest, and non-discrimination. Consistency in approach in scoring applications is of particular importance.” Community Priority Evaluation Panel and its Processes, at 1.

## II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

### A. Community Priority Evaluation and Reconsideration

19. On June 11, 2014, the EIU issued three Community Priority Evaluation Reports, one for each of the three new gTLDs that are the subject of this

proceeding. In order to prevail on each of its applications, Dot Registry would have to have been awarded 14 out of a possible 16 points per application. In the evaluation of each of its three applications, Dot Registry was awarded a total per application of 5 points. Thus, each of the applications submitted did not prevail.

20. The practical result of this failure to prevail is that Dot Registry would be placed in a contention set for each of the proposed gTLDs with other applicants who had applied for one or more of the proposed gTLDs.

21. On April 11, 2013, Dot Registry submitted three Requests for Reconsideration to the BGC, requesting that the BGC reconsider the denial of Dot Registry's applications for Community Priority.

22. The bases for Dot Registry's requests for reconsideration were the following:

- a. The CPE Panel failed to validate all letters of support of and in opposition to its application for Community Priority status;
- b. The CPE Panel failed to disclose the sources, the substance, the methods, or the scope of its independent research;
- c. The CPE Panel engaged in "double counting," which practice is contrary to the criteria established in the AGB;
- d. The Panel failed to evaluate each of Dot Registry's applications independently;
- e. The Panel failed to properly apply the CPE criteria set out in the guidebook for community establishment, community organization, pre-existence, size, and longevity;
- f. The Panel used the incorrect standard in its evaluation of the nexus criterion;

- g. The failure in determining Nexus, led to a failure in determining “uniqueness.”
- h. The Panel erroneously found that Dot Registry had failed to provide for an appropriate appeals process in its applications;
- i. The Panel applied an erroneous standard to determine community support, a standard not contained in the CPE;
- j. The Panel misstated that the European Commission and the Secretary of State of Delaware opposed Dot Registry’s applications and failed to note that the Secretary of State of Delaware had clarified the comment submitted and that the European Commission had withdrawn its comment.

23. In response to Dot Registry’s Requests for Reconsideration of its applications, on July 24, 2014, The Board Governance Committee (“BGC”) issued its Determination that “[Dot Registry] has not stated grounds for reconsideration.” The BGC’s Determination was based on the failure of Dot Registry to show “that either the Panels or ICANN violated any ICANN policy or procedure with respect to the Reports, or ICANN acceptance of those Reports.” Determination of the Board Governance Committee (BGC) Reconsideration Requests 14-30, 14-32, 14-33, 24 July 2014.

B. History of Independent Review Process

24. As all of the party’s substantive submissions and the IRP Panel’s procedural orders are posted on the ICANN web site covering IRP Proceedings (<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dot-registry-v-icann-2014-09-25-en>), this section will serve only to highlight those that contain significant procedural or substantive rulings.

25. On September 22, 2014, Dot Registry requested Independent Review of the denial of reconsideration of each of its three applications. On October 27, 2014, ICANN filed its Response to Dot Registry's request for Independent Review.

26. On November 19, 2014, Dot Registry requested the appointment of an Emergency Panelist and for interim measures of protection. On November 26, 2014, the emergency panelist, having been appointed, issued Procedural Order No. 1, setting out a schedule for the hearing and resolution of the request for interim measures of protection.

27. On December 8, 2014, ICANN filed a Response to Dot Registry's request for emergency relief.

28. On December 23, 2014, the Emergency Independent Review Panelist issued the Emergency Independent Review Panelist's Order on Request for Emergency Measures of Protection. The Order made the following rulings:

1. The Emergency Independent Review Panelist finds that emergency measures of protection are necessary to preserve the pending Independent Review Process as an effective remedy should the Independent Review Panel determine that the award of relief is appropriate.
2. It is therefore ORDERED that ICANN refrain from scheduling an auction for the new gTLDs .INC, .LLP, and .LLC until the conclusion of the pending Independent Review Process.
3. The administrative fees of the ICDR shall be borne as incurred. The compensation of the Independent Review Panelist shall be borne equally by both parties. Each party shall bear all other costs, including its attorneys' fees and expenses, as incurred.

4. This Order renders a final decision on [Dot Registry's] Request for emergency Independent Review Panel and Interim Measures of Protection. All other requests for relief not expressly granted herein are hereby denied

29. The Independent Review Process Panel (the "IRP Panel"), having been duly constituted, issued a total of thirteen procedural orders, in addition to that issued by the Emergency Independent Review Panelist.

All of the orders were issued by the unanimous IRP Panel. The following are descriptions of portions of those orders particularly germane to the present Declaration.

30. On March 26, 2015, the Independent Review Process Panel [the "IRP Panel"] having been duly constituted, the IRP Panel issued an Amended Procedural Order No. 2. Among other matters covered therein, pursuant to its powers under ICDR Rules of Arbitration, Art. 20, 4 ("At any time during the proceedings, the [panel] may order the parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence it deems necessary or appropriate") the IRP Panel ordered ICANN to produce to the Panel certain documents and gave each party the opportunity to request of the other additional documents.

31. The order which required production of certain documents to the Panel read as follows:

Pursuant to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") and the International Arbitration Rules and Supplementary Procedures for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Independent Review Process of the International Centre for Dispute

Resolution (“ICDR”), the Panel hereby requires ICANN to produce to the Panel and Dot Registry, LLC (“Dot Registry”) no later than April 3, 2015, all non-privileged communications and other documents within its possession, custody or control referring to or describing (a) the engagement by ICANN of the Economist Intelligence Unit (“EIU”) to perform Community Priority Evaluations, including without limitation any Board and staff records, contracts and agreements between ICANN and EIU evidencing that engagement and/or describing the scope of EIU’s responsibilities thereunder, and (b) the work done and to be done by the EIU with respect to the Determination of the ICANN Board of Governance Committee on Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests Nos. 14-30 (.LLC), 14-32 (.INC) and 14-33 (.LLP), dated July 24, 2014, including work done by the EIU at the request, directly or indirectly, of the Board of Governance Committee on or after the date Dot Registry filed its Reconsideration Requests, and (c) consideration by ICANN of, and acts done and decisions taken by ICANN with respect to the work performed by the EIU in connection with Dot Registry’s applications for .INC, .LLC, and/or .LLP, including at the request, directly or indirectly, of the Board of Governance Committee.

32. In Procedural Order No. 3, issued May 24, 2015, the Panel’s order to ICANN to produce documents was clarified as follows:

The Panel notes that the Panel sought *inter alia* all non-privileged communications and other documents within ICANN’s possession, custody or control referring or describing:

- (a) The engagement by ICANN of the EIU to perform Community Priority Evaluations. That request covers internal ICANN documents and communications, not just communications with the EIU, referring to or describing the subject of the Panel’s request (the engagement to perform Community Priority Evaluations).
- (b) The work done and to be done by the EIU with respect to the Determination of the ICANN board of governance Committee on Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Request. That request again covers internal ICANN documents and communications, not solely communications with EIU, referring to or describing the subject of the Panel’s request (the work done and to be done by the EIU with

- respect to the Determination). As well as the work-product itself in its various draft and final iterations.
- (c) Consideration by ICANN of the work performed by the EIU in connection with Dot Registry's applications. That request again covers internal ICANN documents and communications, not solely communications with the EIU referring to or describing the subject of the Panel's request (consideration by ICANN of the work performed by the EIU).
  - (d) Acts done and decisions taken by ICANN with respect to the work performed by the EIU in connection with Dot Registry's applications. That request again covers internal ICANN documents and communications, not solely communications with the EIU, referring to or describing the subject of the Panel's request (both acts done and decisions taken by ICANN with respect to the EIU work).

The Panel notes that in Section 2 of its amended Procedural Order No. 2, material provided by ICANN to the Panel, but not yet to Dot Registry, appears not to include, among other matters, internal ICANN documents and communications referring to or describing the above subject matters that the Panel would have expected to be created in the ordinary course of ICANN in connection with these matters. It may be that the Panel was less than clear in its requests. The Panel requests that ICANN consider again whether the production was fully responsive to the foregoing requests.

The production shall include names of EIU personnel involved in the work contemplated and the work performed by the EIU in connection with Dot Registry's applications for .INC, .LLC, and/or .LLP with respect to Dot Registry's Reconsideration Requests Nos. 14-30 (.LLC), 14-32 (.INC), and 14-33 (.LLP), dated July 24, 2024, in that such information may be relevant to the requirements of Sections 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.3.1, and 2.4.3.2 of Module 2 of the Applicant Guidebook. The Panel expects strict compliance by Dot Registry and its counsel with Paragraph 8 of this Order and the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Undertaking procedure set forth therein and in Annex 1 attached hereto.

Procedural Order No. 3 included, among other provisions, a confidentiality provision, which provided in pertinent part:

"Documents exchanged by the parties or produced to the Panel at the Panel's directive which contain confidential information:



- i. May not be used for any purpose other than participating in ICDR Case No. 01-14-0001-5004, and;
- ii. May not be referenced in any, and any information contained therein must be redacted from any, written submissions prior to posting.

33. In Procedural Order No. 6, issued June 12, 2015, the Panel reiterated its document production order, made express that the BGC was covered by the reference to the “Board,” and required that documents withheld on the basis of privilege be identified in a privilege log. On June 19, 2015, Counsel for ICANN submitted a confirming attestation, the required privilege log, and an additional responsive email. *See. also*, Procedural Order No. 8, issued August 26, 2015, paragraph 3, first sentence.

34. On July 6, 2015, the IRP Panel issued Procedural Order No. 7. That order memorialized the parties’ stipulations that the term “local law” as used in Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation was a reference to California law and that under California law, in the event of a conflict between a corporation’s Bylaws and Articles, the Articles of Incorporation would prevail.

35. In Procedural Order No. 8, “[t]he Panel designate[d] the place of these proceedings as New York, New York.”

36. In Procedural Order No. 12, issued February 26, 2016, the Panel ordered that the hearing would be by video conference and would be limited to seven hours. No live percipient or expert witness testimony would be permitted, and only the witness statements and documents

previously submitted by the parties and accepted by the panel would be admitted. (ICANN had previously submitted one witness declaration, that of <sup>EIU Contact Information Redacted</sup> of the EIU. Dot Registry had previously submitted four witness declarations and one expert witness declaration.) The hearing would consist of arguments by counsel and questions from the Panel. A stenographic transcript of the proceedings would be prepared.

37. On March 29, 2016, a one-day hearing by video conference was held with party representatives and counsel and the Panel present in either Washington, D.C. or Los Angeles, California. Each party presented arguments in support of its case, and the Panel had the opportunity to ask questions of counsel. A stenographic transcript of the proceedings was made. During the hearing, Dot Registry attempted to introduce live testimony from a fact witness. The Panel declined to hear testimony from the proffered witness. Hearing Tr., at p. 42, ll. 11-15. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Panel requested that the parties address specific questions in a post-hearing memorial.

38. On April 8, 2016, the parties filed post-hearing memorials addressing the questions posed by the Panel.

39. On May 5, 2016, the parties stipulated to the correction of limited inaccuracies in the stenographic transcript, which changes were duly noted by the Panel.

### III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

#### A. Dot Registry

40. Dot Registry states that the applicable law(s) to be applied in this proceeding are ICANN's Articles of Incorporation ("Articles") and Bylaws, relevant principles of international law (such as good faith) and the doctrine of legitimate expectations, applicable international conventions, the laws of the State of California ("California law"), the Applicant Guidebook ("AGB"), the International Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution ("ICDR Rules"), and the Supplementary Procedures for the Independent Review Process (the "Supplemental Rules"). Prior declarations of IRP panels have "precedential value." Additional Submission of Dot Registry, LLC ("DR Additional Submissions"), ¶¶3, at 2-3, and notes 11, 12, and 15. Request of Dot Registry LLC for Independent Review Process ("DR IRP Request"), ¶ 55, at 20. The Standard of Review should be de novo. DR Additional Submission, ¶¶ 4-7, at 3-5.

41. Dot Registry effectively argues that actions of the ICANN staff and the EIU constitute actions of the ICANN board, because, under California law and ICANN's Bylaws, ICANN's board of directors is "ultimately responsible" for the conduct of the new gTLD program. Since ICANN is a California nonprofit public-benefit corporation, all of its activities must be undertaken by or under the direction of its Board of Directors. DR

Additional Submission, ¶¶ 12-14, at 7-8 and notes 37-40; IRP Request, ¶ 62.

42. Dot Registry asserts that ICANN's staff and the EIU are "ICANN affiliated parties," and as such ICANN is responsible for their actions. AGB, Module 6.5.

43. In any event, Dot Registry takes the position that ICANN is responsible for the acts of EIU and the ICANN staff, since EIU can only recommend to ICANN for ICANN's ultimate approval, and ICANN has complete discretion as to whether to follow EIU's recommendations. DR Additional Submission, ¶18, at 11 (citing EIU SoW, §10(b)(ii) – (iv), (vii), at 6.

44. Dot Registry asserts that the EIU also has the understanding that ICANN bears the responsibility for the actions of the EIU in its role as ICANN's evaluator. DR Additional Submission, ¶19, at 11, citing Declaration of EIU Contact Information Redacted

of the EIU, § 3, at 2. In addition, the CPEs were issued on ICANN letterhead, not EIU letterhead. Indeed, on the final page of the CPEs generated by the EIU, there is a disclaimer, which states in pertinent part that "these Community Priority Evaluation results do not necessarily determine the final result of the application." See, e.g., CPE Report 1-990-35979, Report Date: 11 June 2014.

45. Dot Registry contends that under California law the business judgment rule protects the individual corporate directors from complaints by shareholders and other specifically defined persons who are analogous to

shareholders, but does not protect a corporation or a corporate board from actions by third parties. DR Post-Hearing Brief, at 4 – 7.

46. Even assuming *arguendo* that the business judgment rule applies to the present proceeding, Dot Registry argues that it would not protect ICANN, since the ICANN Board and BGC failed to comply with the Articles, Bylaws, and the AGB, performed the acts at issue without making a reasonable inquiry, and failed to exercise proper care, skill and diligence. DR Post Hearing Brief, at 7 – 8.

47. Dot Registry alleges that EIU altered the AGB requirements only as to Dot Registry's applications in the following respects, and thus engaged in unjustified discrimination (disparate treatment) and non-transparent conduct:

- a) Added a requirement in its evaluation that the community must "act" as a community, and that a community must "associate as a community;"
- b) Added the requirement that the organization must have no other function but to represent the community;
- c) Utilized the increased requirement for "association" to abstain from evaluating the requirements of "size" or "longevity;"
- d) Misread Dot Registry's applications in order to find that Dot Registry's registration policies failed to provide "an appropriate appeals mechanism;"

- e) Altered the AGB criteria that the majority of community institutions support the application to require that every institution express “consistent” support;
- f) Altered the requirement that an application must have no relevant opposition to require that an application have no opposition.

See, e.g., Dot Registry Reconsideration Request re *.llc*, Version of 11 April 2013, at 4 -17 (Exhibit C-017).

48. Dot Registry asserts that the EIU applied different standards to other CPE applications, applying those standards inconsistently across all applicants.

49. While EIU required Dot Registry to demonstrate that its communities “act” and “associated” as communities, it did not require that other communities do so.

50. EIU also required that *.llc*, and *.llp* community members be participants in a clearly defined-industry and that the “members” have an awareness and recognition of their inclusion in the industry community.

51. While noting that “research” supported its conclusions, the EIU failed to identify the research conducted, what the results of the research were, or how such results supported its conclusions.

52. Dot Registry also argued that the Board of Governance Committee (“BGC”) breached its obligations to ensure fair and equitable, reasonable and non-discriminatory treatment.

53. In response to a request for reconsideration, the BGC has the authority to:

- a) conduct a factual investigation (Bylaws, Art. 11, § 3, d);
- b) request additional written submissions from the affected party or other parties (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3, e);
- c) ask ICANN staff for its views on the matter (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 11);
- d) request additional information or clarification from the requestor (Bylaws, Art. IV, §12);
- e) conduct a meeting with requestor by telephone, email, or in person (*Id.*);
- f) request information relevant to the request from third parties (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 13).

The BCG did none of these.

54. Dot Registry requested that the IRP Panel make a final and binding declaration:

- a) that the Board breached its Articles, its Bylaws and the AGB including by failing to determine that ICANN staff and the EIU improperly and discriminatorily applied the AGB criteria for community priority status in evaluating Dot Registry's applications;
- b) that ICANN and the EIU breached the articles, Bylaws and the AGB, including by erring in scoring Dot Registry's CPE applications for *.inc*, *.llc*, and *.llp* and by treating Dot Registry's applications discriminatorily;

- c) that Dot Registry's CPE applications for the *.inc*, *.llc*, and *.llp* strings satisfy the CPE criteria set forth in the AGB and that Dot Registry's applications are entitled to community priority status;
- d) recommending that the Board issue a resolution confirming the foregoing;
- e) awarding Dot Registry its costs in this proceeding, including, without limitation, all legal fees and expenses; and
- f) awarding such other relief as the Panel may find appropriate in the circumstances.

Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief, April 8, 2016 ("DR Post-Hearing Brief"), at 9.

55. Finally, Dot Registry stated that it "does not believe that a declaration recommending that the Board should send Dot Registry's CPE applications to a new evaluation by the EIU would be proper." DR Post-Hearing Brief, at 9.

## B. ICANN

56. ICANN asserts that ICANN's Articles and Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures apply to an IRP proceeding. ICANN's Response to Claimant Dot Registry LLC's Request for Independent Review Process, October 27, 2014 ("ICANN Response"), ¶21, at 8, and ¶



29, at 9. ICANN's Response to Claimant Dot Registry LLC's Additional Submission ("Response to Additional Submission"), ¶2, at 1; ¶ 8, at 3.

57. ICANN argues that "there is only one Board action at issue in this IRP, the BGC's review of the reconsideration requests Dot Registry filed challenging the CPE Reports." Response to Additional Submission, ¶ 8, at 3.

58. ICANN contends that this standard only applies as to the BGC's actions (or inactions) in its reconsideration of the EIU or ICANN staff actions. Response to Additional Submission, ¶ 10, at 4; ¶13, at 5

59. ICANN argues that the Bylaws make clear that the IRP review does not extend to actions of ICANN staff or of third parties acting on behalf of ICANN staff, such as the EIU.

60. ICANN contends that, when the BGC responds to a Reconsideration Request, the standard applicable to the BGC's review looks to whether or not the CPE Panel violated "any established policy or procedure." ICANN Response, ¶45, at 20, ¶¶ 46 and 47, at 21. Response to Additional Submission, ¶ 7, at 2; ¶14, at 6 and note 10; ¶ 19, at 8.

61. ICANN argues that Dot Registry failed to show that the EIU violated any established policies and procedures, on one occasion referring to "rules and procedures," in another to "established ICANN policy(ies)," and in another to "appropriate policies and procedures." Response to Additional Submission, ¶ 7, at 2; ¶14, at 6 and note 10, and ¶19, at 8

62. ICANN contends that Dot Registry failed to show that the BGC actions in its reconsideration were not in accordance with ICANN's Articles and Bylaws. Response to Additional Submission, ¶¶ 21, at 9, and ¶¶ 23 at 10. However, ICASNN has never argued in these proceedings that Dot Registry failed timely or properly to raise claims of *inter alia* disparate treatment/unjustified discrimination, lack of transparency or other alleged breaches of Articles, Bylaws, or AGB by the BGC, only that Dot Registry failed to prove its case on those matters.

63. ICANN agrees that "the 'rules' at issue when assessing the Board's conduct with respect to the New gTLD Program include relevant provisions of the Guidebook." Letter of Jeffrey A. LeVee, Jones Day LLP, to the Panel, dated October 12, 2015, at 6.

64. In response to a question from the Panel, ICANN asserts that, in its Call for Expressions of Interest for a New gTLD Comparative Evaluation Panel (R-12), ICANN did not require the ICANN staff and EIU to adhere to ICANN's Bylaws. ICANN denied that the reference therein that "the evaluation process for selection of new gTLDs will respect the principles of fairness, transparency, avoiding potential conflicts of interest, and non-discrimination" and its request "that candidates include a 'statement of the candidate's plan for ensuring fairness, nondiscrimination and transparency" obligated the EIU and the ICANN staff to adhere to any of ICANN's Articles or Bylaws. ICANN's Post-Hearing Brief, ¶¶ 6, 7, and 8, at 4.

65. In response to the Panel's question as to whether the Call for Expressions of Interest called for EIU to comply with other ICANN policies and procedures, ICANN stated that the Call for Expressions of Interest required applicants to "respect the principles of fairness, transparency and . . . non-discrimination." ICANN's Post-Hearing Submission, dated April 8, 2016, at ¶ 5.

66. ICANN asserts that California's business judgment rule applies to ICANN and "requires deference to actions of a corporate board of directors so long as the board acted 'upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests of' the corporation, and 'exercised discretion clearly within the scope of its authority.'" Post—Hearing Brief, ¶ 1, at 1, and *Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass'n*, 21 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 249, 265 (1999).

#### IV. DECLARATION OF PANEL

##### A. Applicable Principles of Law

67. The Panel declares that the principles of law applicable to the present proceeding are ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, its Bylaws, the laws of the State of California, the Supplemental Rules, and the ICDR Rules of Arbitration. The Panel does not find that there are "relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions" that would assist it in the task now before it.

68. The review undertaken by the Panel is based on an objective and independent standard, neither deferring to the views of the Board (or the

BGC), nor substituting its judgment for that of the Board. As the IRP in the *Vistaprint v. ICANN* Final Declaration stated (ICDR Case No. 01-14-0000-6505, 9 October 2015:

123. The Bylaws state the IRP Panel is 'charged' with 'comparing' contested actions of the board to the Articles and Bylaws and 'declaring' whether the Board has acted consistently with them. The Panel is to focus, in particular, on whether the Board acted without conflict of interest, exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it, and exercised independent judgement in taking a decision believed to be in the best interests of ICANN. In the IRP Panel's view this more detailed listing of a defined standard cannot be read to remove from the Panel's remit the fundamental task of comparing actions or inactions of the Board with the articles and Bylaws and declaring whether the Board has acted consistently or not. Instead, the defined standard provides a list of questions that can be asked, but not to the exclusion of other potential questions that might arise in a particular case as the Panel goes about its comparative work. For example, the particular circumstance may raise questions whether the Board acted in a transparent or non-discriminatory manner. In this regard the ICANN Board's discretion is limited by the Articles and Bylaws, and it is against the provisions of these instruments that the Board's conduct must be measured.

124. The Panel agrees with ICANN's statement that the Panel is neither asked to, nor allowed to, substitute its judgment for that of the Board. However, this does not fundamentally alter the lens through which the Panel must view its comparative task. As *Vistaprint* has urged, the IRP is the only accountability mechanism by which ICANN holds itself accountable through independent third party review of its actions or inactions. Nothing in the Bylaws specifies that the IRP Panel's review must be founded on a deferential standard, as ICANN has asserted. Such a standard would undermine the Panel's primary goal of ensuring accountability on the part of ICANN and its Board, and would be incompatible with ICANN's commitment to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability, as required by ICANN's Affirmation of Commitments, Bylaws and core values.

125. The IRP Panel is aware that three other IRP Panels have considered this issue of standard of review and degree of deference to be accorded, if any, when assessing the conduct of ICANN's Board. All of the have reached the same conclusion: the

board's conduct is to be reviewed and appraised by the IRP Panel using an objective and independent standard without any presumption of correctness. (Footnote omitted).

69. In this regard, the Panel concludes that neither the California business judgment rule nor any other applicable provision of law or charter documents compels the Panel to defer to the BGC's decisions. The Bylaws expressly charge the Panel with the task of testing whether the Board has complied with the Articles and Bylaws (and, as agreed by ICANN, with the AGB). Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3.11, c provides that an "IRP Panel shall have the authority to declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws." Additionally, the business judgment rule does not in any event extend under California law to breaches of obligation as contrasted with its application to the exercise of discretionary board judgment within the scope of such an obligation.

70. An IRP Panel is tasked with declaring whether the ICANN Board has, by its action or inaction, acted inconsistently with the Articles and Bylaws. It is not asked to declare whether the applicant who sought reconsideration should have prevailed. Thus, the Dissent's focus on whether Dot Registry should have succeeded in its application for community priority is entirely misplaced. As counsel for ICANN explained:

Mr. LeVee: \*\*\*

. . . the singular purpose of an independent review proceeding, as confirmed time and again by other independent review panels, is to test whether the conduct of the board of ICANN and only of the

board of ICANN was consistent with ICANN's articles and with ICANN's bylaws.

Hearing Tr., p. 75, l. 24 – p. 76, l. 5.

B. Nature of Declaration

71. The question has arisen in some prior Declarations of IRP Panels whether Panel declarations are “binding” or “non-binding.” While this question is an interesting one, it is clear beyond cavil that this or any Panel’s decision on that question is not binding on any court of law that might be called upon to decide this issue.

72. In order of precedence from Bylaws to Applicant Guidebook, there have been statements in the documents which the Panel, or a reviewing court, might consider in its determination as to the finality of an IRP Panel Declaration.

73. As noted, above, Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3.11, c specifies that an “IRP Panel shall have the authority to declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3.11, d provides that the IRP Panel may “recommend that the Board stay any action or decision . . . until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP. Article IV, Section 3.21 provides that “[t]he declarations of the IRP Panel . . . are final and have precedential value.”

74. The ICDR Rules contains a provision that “[a]wards . . . shall be final and binding on the parties.” ICDR Rules, Art. 27(1).

75. The Applicant Guidebook requires that any applicant “AGREE NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR IN ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN AND ICANN AFFILIATED PARTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION.” AGB, Module 6, Section 6 (all caps as in original).

Assuming *arguendo* this waiver would be found to be effective, it would not appear to reach the question of finality of a Panel Declaration.

76. One Panel has declared that its declaration is non-binding (*ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08, at ¶134), while another has declared that its declaration is binding. *DCA Trust v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 50-2013-001083, Declaration on IRP Procedures, August 14, 2014, at ¶¶ 98, 100-107, 110-111, and 115.

77. Other panels have either expressed no opinion on this issue, or have found some portion of the declaration binding, and another portion non-binding. Further, the Panel understands that this issue may have arisen before one or more courts of law, but that no final decisions have yet been rendered.

78. Since any declaration we might make on this issue would not be binding on any reviewing court, the Panel does not purport to determine whether its declaration is binding or non-binding.

C. The Merits

1) The EIU, ICANN Staff, and the BGC Were Obligated to Follow ICANN's Articles and Bylaws in Performing Their Work in this Matter

79. Whether the BGC is evaluating a Reconsideration Request or the IRP Panel is reviewing a Reconsideration Determination, the standard to be applied is the same: Is the action taken consistent with the Articles, the Bylaws, and the AGB?

80. The BGC's determination that the standard for its evaluation is that a requestor must demonstrate that the ICANN staff and/or the EIU acted in contravention of established policy or procedure is without basis.

81. In response to the three reconsideration requests at issue, the BGC states that "ICANN has previously determined that the reconsideration process can be properly invoked for challenges to determinations rendered by third party service providers, such as EIU, where it can be stated that a Panel failed to follow the established policies or procedures in reaching its determination, or that staff failed to follow its policies or procedures in accepting that determination." Reconsideration Determination of Reconsideration Requests 14-30, 14-32, 14-33, 24 July 2014, Section IV, at 7-8.

82. For this proposition, the BGC cites its own decision in the *Booking.com B.V. v. ICANN* Reconsideration Request Determination 13-5,



1 August 2013. In that case the BGC references a previous section of the Bylaws, that contains language currently in Section IV, 2, a, which states in pertinent part, that a requestor may show it has been “adversely affected by one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict ICANN policy(ies).”

83. Curiously, the BGC ignores Article IV, Section 1, entitled ‘PURPOSE,’ which sets out the purpose of the Accountability and Review provisions. Article IV, Section 1 applies to both reconsiderations by the BGC, as well as to the IRP process. It states: “In carrying out its mission as set out in these bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article 1 of these Bylaws. The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions . . . are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws, including the transparency provisions of Article III. . . .” (Emphasis added).

84. Indeed, in its Call for Expressions of Interest for a New gTLD Comparative Evaluation Panel, including from the EIU, ICANN insisted that the evaluation process employed by prospective community priority panels “respect the principles of fairness, transparency, avoiding potential conflicts of interest, and non-discrimination.” As discussed, *infra*, at ¶¶ 101 – 106, all of these principles are embodied in ICANN’s Bylaws, and

are applicable to conduct of the BGC, ICANN staff and the authority exercised by the EIU pursuant to contractual delegation from ICANN.

85. ICANN further required all applicants for evaluative panels, including the EIU, to include in their applications a statement of the applicants' plan for ensuring that the above delineated principles are applied. ICANN Call for Expressions of Interest (Exhibit R-12), Section 5.5 at 6.

86. Subsequent to its engagement by ICANN, the EIU prepared the Community Priority Evaluation Guidelines, Version 2.0 (27 September 2013 (Exhibit R-1), under supervision from ICANN, incorporating the same principles. At page 22 of the Guidelines, it states: "The evaluation process will respect the principles of fairness, transparency, avoiding potential conflicts of interest and non-discrimination. Consistency of approach in scoring Applications will be of particular importance." (Emphasis added). These CPE Guidelines "are an accompanying document to the AGB, and are meant to provide additional clarity around the process and scoring principles outlined in the AGB."

87. Even if one were to accept the BGC's contention that it only need look to whether ICANN staff or the EIU violated "established policies and procedures," nowhere has ICANN argued that fairness, transparency, avoiding potential conflicts of interest, and non-discrimination are **not** established policies and procedures of ICANN. Indeed, given that all of these criteria are called out in provisions of ICANN's Articles and Bylaws

as quoted elsewhere in this declaration, it would be shocking if ICANN were to make such an argument.

88. Accordingly, the Panel majority declares that in performing its duties of Reconsideration, the BGC must determine whether the CPE (in this case the EIU) and ICANN staff respected the principles of fairness, transparency, avoiding conflicts of interest, and non-discrimination as set out in the ICANN Articles, Bylaws and AGB. These matters were clearly raised in Dot Registry's submissions. The Panel majority declares that the BGC failed to make the proper determinations as to compliance by ICANN staff and the EIU with the Articles, Bylaws, and AGB, let alone to undertake the requisite due diligence or to conduct itself with the transparency mandated by the Articles and Bylaws in the conduct of the reconsideration process.

89. The Panel majority further declares that the contractual use of the EIU as the agent of ICANN does not vitiate the requirement to comply with ICANN's Articles and Bylaws, or the Board's duty to determine whether ICANN staff and the EIU complied with these obligations. ICANN cannot avoid its responsibilities by contracting with a third party to perform ICANN's obligations. It is the responsibility of the BGC in its reconsideration to insure such compliance. Indeed, the CPEs themselves were issued on the letterhead of ICANN, not that of the EIU, and Module 5 of the Applicant Guidebook states that "ICANN's Board of Directors has

ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program.” AGB, Module 5, at 5-4.

90. Moreover, ICANN tacitly acknowledged as much by submitting the Declaration of EIU Contact Information Redacted

of the Economist Intelligence Unit, the person who negotiated the services agreement with ICANN. EIU Contact Information Redacted also served as Project Director for EIU’s work on behalf of ICANN.

91. In his declaration, EIU Contact Information Redacted states that the EIU is “not a gTLD decision-maker, but simply a consultant to ICANN.” “The parties agreed that EIU, while performing its contracted functions, would operate largely in the background, and that ICANN would be solely responsible of all legal matters pertaining to the application process.”

92. Further, as noted above in paragraph 8 of EIU Contact Information Redacted Declaration, Section 10 of the EIU SoW provides that “ICANN will be free in its complete discretion to decide whether or not to follow [EIU’s] determination,” that “ICANN will be solely responsible to applicants . . . for the decisions it decides to issue,” and that “each decision must be issued by ICANN in its own name only.”

93. Moreover, EIU did not act on its own in performing the CPEs that are the subject of this proceeding. ICANN staff was intimately involved in the process. The ICANN staff supplied continuing and important input on the CPE reports, See, documents produced to the Panel in response to the Panel’s Document Production Order, ICANN \_DR-00461-466. DR00182-

194, DR 00261—267, DR00228-234, DR00349-355, DR-00547-553, DR00467- 473 and DR00116-122.

94. One example is particularly instructive. In its Request for Reconsideration for *.inc*, Dot Registry complained that “the Panel repeatedly relies on its ‘research.’ For example, the Panel states that its decision not to award any points to the **.INC** Community Application for 1-A Delineation is based on ‘[r]esearch [that] showed that firms are typically organized around specific industries, locales, and other criteria not related to the entities structure as an *.inc*’ and also that ‘[b]ased on the Panel’s research there is no evidence of incs from different sectors acting as a community as defined by the Applicant Guidebook.” “Thus, the Panel’s ‘research’ was a key factor in its decision not to award at least four (but possibly more) points to the *.inc* Community Application. However, despite the significance of this ‘research,’ the Panel never cites any sources or gives any information about its substance or the methods or scope of the ‘research.’” Dot Registry Request for Reconsideration re *.inc*, § 8, B at 5-6.

95. The BGC made short shrift of this argument. “The Requestor argues that the Panels improperly conducted and relied upon independent research while failing to ‘cit[e] any sources or give[] any information about [] the substance or the methods or scope of the ‘research.’” (Citations omitted.) “As the Requestor acknowledges, Section 4.2.3 of the Guidebook expressly authorizes CPE Panels to ‘perform independent

research, if deemed necessary to reach informed scoring decisions.”

(Citations omitted). “The Requestor cites no established policy or procedure (because there is none) requiring a CPE Panel to disclose details regarding the sources, scope or methods of its independent research.” Reconsideration Response, § V.B at 11.

96. A review of the documents produced and the ongoing exchange between the EIU and the ICANN staff reveal the origin of the “research” language found in the final version of the CPEs.

97. The original draft CPEs prepared by the EIU, dated 19 May 2014 at page 2, paragraph beginning “However . . .” contain no reference to any “research.” See DR00229, 00262, and 00548.

98. The first references to the use of “research” comes from ICANN staff. “Can we add a bit more to express the research and reasoning that went into this statement? . . .Possibly something like, ‘based on the Panel’s research we could not find any widespread evidence of LLCs from different sectors acting as a community.’” DR00468. “While I agree, I’d like to see some substantiation, something like . . . ‘based on our research we could not find any widespread evidence of LLCs from different sectors acting as a community.’” DR00548.

99. The CPEs as issued read in pertinent part at page 2, in paragraph beginning “However . . .,” “Research showed that firms are typically organized around specific industries, locales, and other criteria not related to the entities structure as an LLC. Based on the Panel’s research, there

is no evidence of LLCs from different sectors acting as a community as defined in the Applicant Guidebook.”

100. Counsel for ICANN at the hearing acknowledged that ICANN staff is bound to conduct itself in accordance with ICANN's Articles and Bylaws.

Panelist Donahey: So when you hear the word “ICANN” or see the word “ICANN in the bylaws or articles you believe that that is a , is a reference to ICANN’s board and its constituent bodies?

Mr. LeVee: Including its staff, yes

Panelist Kantor: My chair anticipated a question I was going to ask, but he combined it with a question about constituent bodies. I believe I heard, Mr. LeVee, that you said that while the CPE panel is not bound by the provisions I identified, ICANN staff is. Is that correct?

[Mr. LeVee:] Yes. ICANN views its staff as being obligated to conform to the various article and bylaw provisions that you cite.

Hearing Tr., p. 197, l. 20 – p. 198, l.1; p. 199, l. 17 - p. 200, l. 2 (emphasis added).

101. The facts that ICANN staff was intimately involved in the production of the CPE and that ICANN staff was obligated to follow the Articles and Bylaws, further support the Panel majority's finding that ICANN staff and the EIU were obligated to comply with ICANN's Articles and Bylaws. Moreover, when the issues were posed in the Reconsideration Requests, in the course of determining whether or not ICANN staff and the EIU had acted in compliance with the Articles, Bylaws, and the AGB, the BGC was obligated under the Bylaws to exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them and exercise independent

judgment in taking the decision believed to be in the best interests of ICANN.

## 2) The Relevant Provisions of the Articles and Bylaws and Their Application

The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations. Articles of Incorporation, Art. 4

In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN:

\*\*\*\*

7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.
8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.
9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.
10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.



11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values. Bylaws, Art. I, § 2. CORE VALUES.

ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition. Bylaws, Art. II, § 3. Non-Discriminatory Treatment.

The Board shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. Bylaws, Art. III, §1.

In carrying out its mission as set out in these bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these bylaws. Art. IV, § 1.

103. In addition, the BGC failed several transparency obligations. As well as failing to enforce the transparency obligations in the Articles, Bylaws, and AGB with respect to the research purportedly undertaken by the EIU, the BGC is also subject to certain requirements that it make public the staff work on which it relies. Bylaws, Art. IV.2.11 provides that "The Board Governance Committee may ask the ICANN staff for its views on the

matter, which comments shall be made publicly available on the Website.”  
Bylaws, Art. IV.2.14 provides that “The Board Governance Committee shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by the party seeking reconsideration or review, by the ICANN staff, and by any third party.”

104. The Panel is tasked with determining whether the ICANN Board acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles and Bylaws. Bylaws Article IV, Section 3.11, c states that “[t]he IRP Panel shall have the authority to declare whether an action of inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.” As accepted by ICANN, the Panel is also tasked with determining whether the ICANN Board acted consistently with the AGB. Moreover, the Bylaws provide:

Requests for [] independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel (“IRP Panel”), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:

- a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?
- b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and
- c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision believed to be in the best interests of the company?

Bylaws. Art. IV, §3.4.

ICANN's counsel stated at the hearing that the concept of inaction or the omission to act is embraced within "actions of the Board."

Panelist Kantor: At an earlier stage in these proceedings, the panel asked some questions, and we were advised that action here includes both actions and omissions. Does that apply to conduct of ICANN staff or only to conduct of the ICANN Board?

Mr. LeVee: Only to Board.

Hearing Tr., p. 192, l. 25 – p. 193, l. 6.

105. Thus, ICANN confirmed that omissions by the Board to comply with its duties under the Articles and Bylaws constituted breaches of the Articles and Bylaws for purposes of an IRP. See, *also*, ICANN's response to Dot Registry's Submission, ¶ 10 (10 August 2015) ("the only way in which conduct of ICANN staff or third parties is reviewable is to the extent that the board allegedly breached ICANN's Articles or Bylaws in acting (or failing to act) with respect to that conduct.") and Letter of Jeffrey A. LeVee, Jones, Day LLP, to the Panel, October 12, 2015, at 6 ("ICANN agrees with the statements in Paragraph 53 of the Booking.com IRP Panel's Declaration that . . . the term "action" as used in Article IV, Section 3 of ICANN's Bylaws encompasses inactions by the ICANN Board . . . .")

106. As discussed, *supra*, at ¶¶ 47-52, Dot Registry contended that the CPE lacked transparency, such as the subject of the research performed, the sources referenced in the performance of the research, the manner in which the research was performed, the results of the research, whether the researchers encountered sources that took issue with the results of

the research, etc. Thus, Dot Registry adequately alleged a breach by ICANN staff and the EIU of the transparency obligations found in the Articles, Bylaws, and AGB.

107. Dot Registry further asserted that it was treated unfairly in that the scoring involved double counting, and that the approach to scoring other applications was inconsistent with that used in scoring its applications. *Id.*

108. Dot Registry alleged that it was subject to different standards than were used to evaluate other Community Applications which underwent CPE, and that the standards applied to it were discriminatory. *Id.*

109. Yet, the BGC failed to address any of these assertions, other than to recite that Dot Registry had failed to identify any “established policy or procedure” which had been violated.

110. Article IV, Section 3.4 of the Bylaws calls upon this Panel to determine whether the BGC, in making its Reconsideration Decision “exercise[d] due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them” and “exercise[d] independent judgment in taking the decision believed to be in the best interests of the company.”

Consequently, the Panel must consider whether, in the face of Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests, the BGC employed the requisite due diligence and independent judgment in determining whether or not ICANN staff and the EIU complied with Article, Bylaw, and AGB obligations such as transparency and non-discrimination.

111. Indeed, the BGC admittedly did not examine whether the EIU or ICANN staff engaged in unjustified discrimination or failed to fulfill transparency obligations. It failed to make any reasonable investigation or to make certain that it had acted with due diligence and care to be sure that it had a reasonable amount of facts before it.

112. An exchange between Panelist Kantor and counsel for ICANN underscores the cavalier treatment which the BGC accorded to the Dot Registry Requests for Reconsideration.

Panelist Kantor: Mr. LeVee, in those minutes or in the determinations on the reconsideration requests, is there evidence that the Board considered whether or not the CPE panel report or any conduct of the staff complied with the various provisions of the bylaws to which I referred, core values, inequity, nondiscriminatory treatment, or to the maximum extent open and transparent.

Mr. LeVee: I doubt it. Not that I'm aware of. As I said, the Board Governance Committee has not taken the position that the EIU or any other outside vendor is obligated to conform to the bylaws in this respect. So I doubt they would have looked at that subject.

Hearing Tr., p. 221, l. 17 – p. 222, l. 8.

113. Notably, the Panel question above inquired as to whether the Board considered *either* the conduct of the CPE panel (*i.e.*, the EIU) or the conduct of ICANN staff. Counsel's response that he doubted whether consideration was given relied solely upon the BGC's position that *the EIU* was not obligated to comply with the Bylaws. Regardless of whether that position is correct, ICANN acknowledges that the conduct of *ICANN staff* (as described *supra*, at ¶¶89-101) is bound by the Articles, Bylaws, and AGB. ICANN's argument fails to recognize that in any event the conduct

of ICANN staff is properly the subject of review by the BGC when raised in a Request for Reconsideration, yet no such review of the allegedly discriminatory and non-transparent conduct of ICANN staff was undertaken by the BGC.

114. One of the questions on which an IRP Panel is asked to “focus” is whether the BGC “exercise[d] due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts” in front of it. In making this determination, the Panel must look to the allegations in order to determine what facts would have assisted the BGC in making its determination.

115. As discussed, *supra*, at ¶¶ 51 and 94 - 95, the requestor argued that the EIU repeatedly referred to “research” it had performed in making its assessment, without disclosing the nature of the research, the source(s) to which it referred, the methods used, or the information obtained. This is effectively an allegation of lack of transparency.

116. Transparency was yet another of the principles which an applicant for the position of Community Priority Evaluator, such as EIU, was required to respect. Indeed, an applicant for the position was required to submit a plan to ensure that transparency would be respected in the evaluation process. *See, generally, supra*, ¶¶ 17 – 18.

117. Transparency is one of the essential principles in ICANN’s creation documents, and its name reverberates through its Articles and Bylaws.

118. In ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Article 4 refers to "open and transparent processes." Among the Core Values listed in its Bylaws intended to "guide the decisions and actions of ICANN" is the "employ[ment of] open and transparent policy development mechanisms." Bylaws, Art. I, § 2.7.

119. Indeed, ICANN devotes an entire article in its bylaws to the subject. Article III of the Bylaws is entitled, "TRANSPARENCY." It states that "ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness." Bylaws, Art. III, § 1.

120. Moreover, in the very article that establishes the Reconsideration process and the Independent Review Process, it states in Section 1, entitled "PURPOSE:"

In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws. The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN's structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws, including the transparency provisions of Article III. Emphasis added.

121. By their very terms, these obligations govern conduct not only by the Board, but by "ICANN," which necessarily includes its staff.

122. It seems fair to say that transparency is one of the most important of ICANN's core values binding on both the ICANN Board and the ICANN

staff, and one that its contractor, EIU, had pledged to follow in its work for ICANN. The BGC had an obligation to determine whether ICANN staff and the EIU complied with these obligations. An IRP Panel is charged with determining whether the Board, which includes the BGC, complied with its obligations under the Articles and the Bylaws. The failure by the BGC to undertake an examination of whether ICANN staff or the EIU in fact complied with those obligations is itself a failure by the Board to comply with its obligations under the Articles and Bylaws.

123. Has the BGC been given the tools necessary to gather this information as Part of the Reconsideration process? The section on reconsideration (Bylaws, Art. IV, Section 2) provides it with those tools. It gives the BGC the power to “conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate” and to “request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties.” Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.3, d and e. The BGC is entitled to “ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter, which comments shall be made publicly available on the website.” Bylaws, Art. IV, §2.11. The BGC is also empowered to “request information relevant to the request from third parties, and any information collected from third parties shall be provided to the requestor [for reconsideration].” Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.13.

124. The requestor for reconsideration in this case also complained that the standards applied by the ICANN staff and the EIU to its applications were different from those that the ICANN staff and EIU had applied to



other successful applicants. If this were true, the EIU would not only have failed to respect the principles of fairness and non-discrimination it had assured ICANN that it would respect, it would not have lived up to its own assurance to all applicants for CPEs in its CPE Guidelines (Exhibit R-1) that “consistency of approach in scoring applications will be of particular importance.” *See, supra*, ¶¶ 18 and 83.

125. The BGC need only have compared what the ICANN staff and EIU did with respect to the CPEs at issue to what they did with respect to the successful CPEs to determine whether the ICANN staff and the EIU treated the requestor in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. The facts needed were more than reasonably at hand. Yet the BGC chose not to test Dot Registry’s allegations by reviewing those facts. It cannot be said that the BGC exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it.

126. The Panel is called upon by Bylaws Art. IV.3.4 to focus on whether the Board, in denying Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests, exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it and exercised independent judgment in taking decisions believed to be in the best interest of ICANN. The Panel has considered above whether the BGC complied with its “due diligence” duty. Here the Panel considers whether the BGC complied with its “independent judgment” duty.

127. The Panel has no doubt that the BGC believes its denials of the Dot Registry Reconsideration Requests were in the best interests of ICANN.

However, the record makes it exceedingly difficult to conclude that the BGC exercised independent judgment in taking those decisions. The only documentary evidence in the record in that regard is the text of the Reconsideration Decisions themselves and the minutes of the BGC meeting at which those decisions were taken. No witness statements or testimony with respect to those decisions were presented by ICANN, the only party to the proceeding who could conceivably be in possession of such evidence.

128. The silence in the evidentiary record, and the apparent use by ICANN of the attorney-client privilege and the litigation work-product privilege to shield staff work from disclosure to the Panel, raise serious questions in the minds of the majority of the Panel members about the BGC's compliance with mandatory obligations in the Bylaws to make public the ICANN staff work on which it relies in reaching decisions about Reconsideration Requests.

129. Bylaws Art. IV.2.11 provides that "The Board Governance Committee may ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter, which comments shall be made publicly available on the Website."

130. Bylaws Art. IV.2.14 provides that "The Board Governance Committee shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by the party seeking reconsideration or review, by the ICANN staff, and by any third party."

131. Elsewhere in the Bylaws and the Articles of Incorporation, as discussed above, ICANN undertakes general duties of transparency and accountability that are also implicated by ICANN's decision to shield relevant staff work from public disclosure by structuring the staff work to benefit from legal privilege.

132. The documents disclosed by ICANN to the Panel pursuant to the Panel's document orders do not include any documents sent from BGC members to ICANN staff or sent from any Board members to any other Board members. The privilege log submitted by ICANN in these proceedings does not list any documents either sent from Board members to any ICANN staff or sent from any Board member to any other Board member, only a small number of documents sent from ICANN staff to the BGC. The only documents of the BGC that were disclosed to the Panel are the denials of the relevant Reconsideration Request themselves, the agendas for the relevant BGC meetings found on the ICANN website, and the Minutes of those meetings also found on the ICANN website.

133. No documents from ICANN staff to the BGC have been disclosed to the Panel. The privilege log lists one document, dated July 18, 2014, which appears to be the ICANN in-house legal counsel submission to the BGC of the "board package" for the July 24, 2014 BGC meeting at which Dot Registry's Reconsideration Requests were considered. The Panel infers that package included an agenda for the meeting, the CPEs themselves and draft denials prepared by ICANN staff, consistent with a

statement to that effect by ICANN counsel at the hearing. As explained by ICANN counsel at the hearing, that package also apparently included ICANN staff recommendations regarding the CPEs and the Reconsideration Requests, prepared by ICANN legal counsel. The Panel presumes the “package” also included Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests, setting out Dot Registry’s views arguing for reconsideration.

134. There is nothing in either the document production record or the privilege log to indicate that the denials drafted by ICANN staff were modified in any manner after presentation by staff to the BGC. Rather, from that record it would appear that the denials were approved by the BGC without change. It is of course possible that changes were in fact made to the draft denials involving ICANN legal counsel, but not produced to the Panel. However, nothing in the privilege log indicates that to be the case.

135. The privilege log submitted by ICANN in this proceeding also lists one other document dated August 15, 2014, which appears to be the “board package” for the August 22, 2014 BGC meeting at which the BGC *inter alia* approved the Minutes for the July 24 BGC meeting. Since the agenda and the Minutes for that August 22 meeting, as available on the ICANN website, do not show any reference to the gTLDs at issue in this IRP, it would appear that the material in the August 15 privileged document related to this dispute is only the draft of the Minutes for the July 24 BGC meeting, which Minutes were duly approved at the August 22 BGC

meeting according to the Minutes for that latter meeting. Thus, the August 15 privileged document adds little to assist the Panel in deciding whether the Board exercised the requisite diligence, due care and independent judgment.

136. Every other document listed on the privilege log is an internal ICANN staff document, not a BGC document.

137. From this disclosure and from statements by ICANN counsel at the hearing, the Panel considers that no documents were submitted to the BGC for the July 24, 2014 BGC meeting other than the agenda for the meeting, the CPEs and Dot Registry's Reconsideration Requests themselves, ICANN staff's draft denials of those Reconsideration Requests, and explanatory recommendations to the BGC from ICANN staff in support of the denials. Moreover, it appears the BGC itself and its members generated no documents except the denials themselves and the related BGC Minutes. ICANN asserted privilege for all materials sent by ICANN staff to the BGC for the BGC meeting on the Reconsideration Requests.

138. The production by ICANN of BGC documents was an issue raised expressly by the unanimous Panel in Paragraph 2 of Procedural Order No. 4, issued May 27, 2015:

Among the documents produced by ICANN in response to the Panel's document production request, the Panel expected to find documents that indicated that the ICANN Board had considered the recommendations made by the EIU concerning Claimant's Community Priority requests, that the ICANN board discussed those recommendations in a meeting of the Board or in a meeting of one or more of its committees or subcommittees

or by its staff under the ICANN Board's direction, the details of such discussions, including notes of the participants thereto, and/or that the ICANN Board itself acted on the EIU recommendation by formal vote or otherwise; or if none of the above, documents indicating that the ICANN board is of the belief that the recommendations of the EIU are binding. If no such documents exist, the Panel requests that ICANN's counsel furnish an attestation to that effect.

139. By letter dated May 29, 2015, counsel for ICANN made the requested confirmation, referring to the Reconsideration Decisions and appending the BGC meeting minutes for the non-privileged record.

140. It is of course entirely possible that oral conversations between staff and members of the BGC, and among members of the BGC, occurred in connection with the July 24 BGC meeting where the BGC determined to deny the reconsideration requests. No ICANN staff or Board members presented a witness statement in this proceeding, however. Also, there is no documentary evidence of such a hypothetical discussion, privileged or unprivileged. Thus apart from *pro forma* corporate minutes of the BGC meeting, no evidence at all exists to support a conclusion that the BGC did more than just accept without critical review the recommendations and draft decisions of ICANN staff.

141. Counsel for ICANN conceded at the hearing that ICANN legal counsel supplied the BGC with recommendations, but asserted the BGC does not rely on those recommendations.

2 \*\*\* I  
3 will tell you that the Board Governance  
4 Committee is aided by the Office of General  
5 Counsel, which also consults with Board  
6 staff.

7 The Office of General Counsel does  
8 submit recommendations to the Board  
9 Governance Committee, and of course, those  
10 documents are privileged. For that reason,  
11 we did not turn them over. We don't rely on  
12 them in issuing the Board Governance  
13 Committee reports, we don't cite them, and we  
14 don't produce them because they are prepared  
15 by counsel.

Hearing Tr., p. 94, l. 2 – 15.

For several reasons, the assertion that the BGC does not rely on ICANN staff recommendations, and thus is not obligated to make those staff views public pursuant to Bylaws Arts. I.2.7 and I.2.10, is simply not credible.

142. First, according to Bylaws Art. IV.2.14, the BGC is to act on Reconsideration Requests “on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by the party seeking reconsideration or review, by the ICANN staff, and by any third party.” Thus, the Bylaws themselves expect the BGC to look to the public written record, including staff views, in making its decisions.

143. Moreover, according to the documents produced by ICANN in this proceeding and the ICANN privilege log, the BGC apparently had no substantive information before it other than the CPEs, the recommendations of ICANN staff regarding the CPEs, including the recommendations of the Office of General Counsel, and the contrary arguments of Dot Registry contained in the Reconsideration Requests. The Minutes for the July 24 BGC meeting state succinctly that “Staff

briefed the BGC regarding Dot Registry, LLC's ("Requester's") request seeking reconsideration of the Community Priority Evaluation ("CPE") Panels' Reports, and ICANN's acceptance of those Reports."

144. Counsel for ICANN made similar points at the hearing.

12 MR. LEVEE: I can.

13 So the Board Governance Committee  
14 had the EIU, the three EIU reports, and it  
15 had the lengthy challenge submitted by Dot  
16 Registry regarding those reports. As I've  
17 said before, the Board Governance Committee  
18 does not go out and obtain separate  
19 substantive advice, because the nature of its  
20 review is not a substantive review.  
21 So I don't know what else it would  
22 need, but my understanding is that apart from  
23 privileged communication, what it had before  
24 it was the materials that I've just  
25 referenced, EIU's reports and Dot Registry's  
1 reconsideration requests, which had attached  
2 to it a number of exhibits.

3 MR. KANTOR: So in evaluating that  
4 request and the CPE panel report, would it be  
5 correct to say that the diligence and care  
6 the Board Governance Committee took in having  
7 a reasonable amount of facts in front of it,  
8 were those two submissions an [sic] inquiry of  
9 staff which is privileged?

10 MR. LEVEE: Yes.

11 MR. KANTOR: Subclause C: How did  
12 the Board Governance Committee go about  
13 exercising its independent judgment in taking  
14 the decisions it took on the reconsideration  
15 requests? Again, with as much specificity as  
16 you can reasonably undertake.

17 MR. LEVEE: The primary thing I  
18 obviously have to refer you to is the report,  
19 the 23-page report of the Board Governance  
20 Committee. I, I don't have other materials  
21 that I have tendered to the panel to say that  
22 the Board members exercised their independent  
23 judgment, beyond the fact that they wrote a



24 document which goes pretty much point by  
25 point through the complaints that Dot  
1 Registry asserted, evaluated each of those  
2 points independently, and reached the  
3 conclusions that they reached.  
4 MR. DONAHEY: Were there drafts of  
5 that 23-page report?  
6 MR. LEVEE: Yes.  
7 MR. DONAHEY: And were those  
8 produced?  
9 MR. LEVEE: They were not.  
10 MR. DONAHEY: And was that because  
11 they were privileged?  
12 MR. LEVEE: Yes.  
13 MR. KANTOR: Mr. LeVee, what exists  
14 in the record before this panel to show that  
15 the Board Governance Committee exercised its  
16 judgment independent from that of ICANN's  
17 staff, including office [of] general counsel?  
18 MR. LEVEE: The record is simply  
19 that the six voting members of the Board  
20 Governance Committee authorized this  
21 particular report after discussing the  
22 report. I cannot give you a length of time  
23 that it was discussed. I don't have a record  
24 of that, but I can tell you, as reflected in  
25 many other situations where similar questions  
1 have been asked, that the voting members of  
2 the Board take these decisions seriously.  
3 They are then reflected in minutes of the  
4 Board Governance Committee which are  
5 published on ICANN's website.  
6 Candidly, I'm not sure what else I  
7 could provide.

Hearing Tr., at pp. 217-219.

145. The BGC thus had before it substantively only the views of the EIU accepted by ICANN staff (the CPEs), the "reports" (i.e., the reconsideration decisions drafted by staff), the staff's own briefing, and the contrary views of Dot Registry. As the Reconsideration Decisions themselves evidence, the BGC certainly did not rely on Dot Registry's

arguments. The BGC therefore simply could not have reached its decision to deny the Reconsideration Requests without relying on work of ICANN staff.

146. The Minutes of the July 24, 2014 BGC meeting state that “After discussion and consideration of the Request[s],” the BGC denied the Reconsideration Requests. Similarly, counsel for ICANN argued at the hearing that “the six voting members of the Board Governance Committee authorized this particular report after discussing the report. \*\*\* I can tell you, as reflected in many other situations where similar questions have been asked, that the voting members of the Board take these decisions seriously.”

147. Arguments by counsel are not, however, evidence. ICANN has not submitted any *evidence* to allow the Panel to objectively and independently determine whether references in the Minutes to discussion by the BGC of the Requests are anything more than corporate counsel’s routine boilerplate drafting for the Minutes. The Panel is well aware that such a *pro forma* statement is regularly included in virtually all corporate minutes recording decisions by board of director committees, regardless of whether or not the discussion was more than rubber-stamping of management decisions.

148. If there is any evidence regarding the extent to which the BGC did in fact exercise independent judgment in denying these Reconsideration Request, rather than relying exclusively on the recommendations of

ICANN staff without exercising diligence, due care and independent judgment, that evidence is shielded by ICANN's invocation of privileges in this matter and ICANN's determination under the Bylaws to avoid witness testimony in IRPs.

149. ICANN is, of course, free to assert attorney-client and litigation work-product privileges in this proceeding, just as it is free to waive those privileges. The ICANN Board is not free, however, to disregard mandatory obligations under the Bylaws. As noted above, Bylaws Art. IV.2.11 provides that "The Board Governance Committee may ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter, which comments shall be made publicly available on the Website." (emphasis added). Bylaws, Art. IV.2.14 provides that "The Board Governance Committee shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by the party seeking reconsideration or review, by the ICANN staff, and by any third party" (emphasis added). The transparency commitments included in the Core Values found in Bylaws, Art. I, §2 are part of a balancing process. However, the obligations in the Bylaws to make that staff work public are compulsory, not optional, and do not provide for any balancing process.

150. None of the ICANN staff work supporting denial of Dot Registry's Reconsideration Requests was made public, even though it is beyond doubt that the BGC obtained and relied upon information and views submitted by ICANN staff (passed through ICANN legal counsel and thus

subject to the shield of privilege) in reaching its conclusions. By exercising its litigation privileges, though, the BGC has put itself in a position to breach the obligatory requirements of Bylaws Art. IV.2.11 and Art. IV.2.14 to make that staff work public. ICANN has presented no real evidence to this Panel that the BGC exercised independent judgment in reaching its decisions to deny the Reconsideration Requests, rather than relying entirely on recommendations of ICANN staff. Thus, the Panel is left highly uncertain as to whether the BGC “exercise[d] due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them” and “exercise[d] independent judgment in taking the decision.” And, by shielding from public disclosure all real evidence of an independent deliberative process at the BGC (other than the *pro forma* meeting minutes), the BGC has put itself in contravention of Bylaws IV.2.11 and IV.2.14 requiring that ICANN staff work on which it relies be made public.

#### D. Conclusion

151. In summary, the Panel majority declares that ICANN failed to apply the proper standards in the reconsiderations at issue, and that the actions and inactions of the Board were inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

152. The Panel majority emphasizes that, in reaching these conclusions, the Panel is not assessing whether ICANN staff or the EIU failed themselves to comply with obligations under the Articles, the Bylaws, or the AGB. There has been no implicit foundation or hint one way or another regarding the substance of the decisions of ICANN staff or the EIU in the Panel majority's approach. Rather the Panel majority has concluded that, in making its reconsideration decisions, the Board (acting through the BGC) failed to exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them and failed to fulfill its transparency obligations (including both the failure to make available the research on which the EIU and ICANN staff purportedly relied and the failure to make publically available the ICANN staff work on which the BGC relied). The Panel majority further concludes that the evidence before it does not support a determination that the Board (acting through the BGC) exercised independent judgment in reaching the reconsideration decisions.

153. The Panel majority declines to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the CPE as to whether Dot Registry is entitled to Community priority. The IRP Panel is tasked specifically "with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws." Bylaws, Art. IV, §3.4. This is what the Panel has done.

154. Pursuant to the ICANN Bylaws, Art. IV, Section 3.18, the Panel declares that Dot Registry is the prevailing party. The administrative fees and expenses of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”) totaling \$4,600.00 and the compensation and expenses for the Panelists totaling \$461,388.70 shall be borne entirely by ICANN. Therefore, ICANN shall pay to Dot Registry, LLC \$235,294.37 representing said fees, expenses and compensation previously incurred by Dot Registry, LLC upon demonstration that these incurred costs have been paid in full.

155. The Panel retains jurisdiction for fifteen days from the issuance of this Declaration solely for the purpose of considering any party’s request to keep certain information confidential, pursuant to Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3.20. If any such request is made and has not been acted upon prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day period set out above, the request will be deemed to have been denied, and the Panel’s jurisdiction will terminate.

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
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156. This Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Declaration of this Panel.

Dated: July 29, 2016

For the Panel Majority

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Mark Kantor". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Mark Kantor

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M. Scott Donahey, Chair

156. This Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Declaration of this Panel.

Dated: July 29, 2016

For the Panel Majority

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Mark Kantor

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "M. Scott Donahey", is written over a horizontal line.

M. Scott Donahey, Chair



## DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CHARLES N. BROWER

1. With the greatest of regard for my two eminent colleagues, I respectfully dissent from their Declaration (“the Declaration”). In my view, Dot Registry LLC’s (“Dot Registry”) Community Priority Evaluation (“CPE”) Applications to operate three generic top level domains (“gTLDs”) (.INC, .LLC, and .LLP) were properly denied, as were Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests to the Board Governance Committee (“BGC”) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). Dot Registry’s requests for relief before this Independent Review Proceeding (“IRP”) Panel should have been rejected in their entirety.
2. I offer four preliminary observations:
3. **First**, the Declaration commits a fundamental error by disregarding the weakness of Dot Registry’s underlying CPE Applications. The applications never had a chance of succeeding. The “communities” proposed by Dot Registry for three types of business entities (INCs, LLCs, and LLPs) do not demonstrate the characteristics of “communities” under any definition. They certainly do not satisfy the standards set forth in ICANN’s Applicant Guidebook (“AGB”), which require applicants to prove “awareness and recognition of [being] a community,” in other words “more . . . cohesion than a mere commonality of interest,”<sup>1</sup> because the businesses in question function in unrelated industries and share nothing in common whatsoever other than their corporate form. As ICANN stated:

*[A] plumbing business that operated as an LLC would not necessarily feel itself to be part of a “community” with a bookstore, law firm, or children’s daycare center simply based on the fact that all four entities happened to organize themselves as LLCs (as opposed to corporations, partnerships, and so forth). Although each entity elected to form as an LLC, the entities literally share nothing else in common.*<sup>2</sup>
4. That foundational flaw in Dot Registry’s underlying CPE Applications alone precluded Dot Registry from succeeding at the CPE stage because failure to prove Criterion #1, “Community Establishment,” deprives an applicant of four points, automatically disqualifying the applicant from reaching the minimum passing score of 14 out of a possible 16 points. Therefore while I do not agree that any violation of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation (“Articles”) or ICANN’s Bylaws (“Bylaws”) occurred in this case, even if it had, this Panel should have concluded that those violations amounted to nothing more than

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<sup>1</sup> AGB § 4.2.3 (“‘Community’ - Usage of the expression ‘community’ has evolved considerably from its Latin origin – ‘*communitas*’ meaning ‘fellowship’ – while still implying more of cohesion than a mere commonality of interest. Notably, as ‘community’ is used throughout the application, there should be: (a) an awareness and recognition of a community among its members; (b) some understanding of the community’s existence prior to September 2007 (when the new gTLD policy recommendations were completed); and (c) extended tenure or longevity—non-transience—into the future.”).

<sup>2</sup> ICANN’s Response to Claimant Dot Registry LLC’s Additional Submission dated 10 Aug. 2016, ¶ 6.

harmless error.<sup>3</sup>

5. Moreover, the BGC in entertaining a Reconsideration Request is entitled to take its views of the underlying CPE into account in deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion under the Bylaws Article IV.3.d to “conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate,” Article IV.3.e to “request additional written submissions . . . from other parties,” Article IV.8.11 or to “ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter.” As ICANN stated in the hearing of this case:

*The fact that you may have your own personal views as to whether the EIU got it right or got it wrong may or may not inform you, your thinking in terms of whether the Board Governance Committee, in assessing the EIU's reports from a procedural standpoint, did so correctly, in essence.<sup>4</sup>*

Hence the BGC’s approach to a Reconsideration Request is in no way necessarily divorced from such views as it may have regarding the underlying subject of the Request.

6. ***Second***, the Declaration purports to limit its analysis to action or inaction of the ICANN Board, but in fact it also examines the application of ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws to ICANN staff and to third-party vendor, the Economic Intelligence Unit (“EIU”). ICANN has conceded that its staff members are subject to its Articles and Bylaws,<sup>5</sup> but ICANN clarified that staff conduct is not reviewable in an IRP,<sup>6</sup> and ICANN has explained that the EIU is neither bound by the Articles or Bylaws, nor may EIU conduct be reviewed in an IRP.<sup>7</sup> The Declaration suggests that it “is *not* assessing whether ICANN staff or the EIU failed themselves to comply with obligations under the Articles, the Bylaws, or the AGB.”<sup>8</sup> The Declaration, however, repeatedly concludes that ICANN staff and the EIU are bound by the Articles and Bylaws.<sup>9</sup> Despite the Declaration’s statement to the contrary,<sup>10</sup> I cannot

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<sup>3</sup> I have no quarrel with the Declaration insofar as it recognizes that this Panel should not “substitute our judgment for the judgment of the [CPE Panels] as to whether Dot Registry is entitled to Community priority.” Declaration ¶ 153. However, I disagree with the Declaration’s statement that “the Dissent’s focus on whether Dot Registry should have succeeded in its action is entirely misplaced.” Declaration ¶ 70. ICANN stated that it expects the IRP Panel might consider the merits of Dot Registry’s underlying CPE Applications when resolving this dispute, *See* Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 254:14–20, and Dot Registry expressly asked the Panel to rule on its CPE Applications. *See* Claimant’s Post-Hearing Brief dated 8 Apr. 2016, ¶ 21 (“As Dot Registry considers it is the Panel’s role to independently resolve this dispute, it affirmatively requests that the Panel not recommend a new EIU evaluation. Instead, Dot Registry requests that the Panel conclusively decide—based on the evidence presented in the final version of the Flynn expert report, including the annexes detailing extensive independent research—that Dot Registry’s CPE applications are entitled to community priority status and recommend that the Board grant the applications that status.”).

<sup>4</sup> Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 254:14–20.

<sup>5</sup> *See* Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 196–97, 199–200, 209.

<sup>6</sup> *See* Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 187–88, 200.

<sup>7</sup> *See* ICANN’s Post-Hearing Submission dated 8 Apr. 2016, ¶¶ 5–8; ICANN’s Response to Claimant Dot Registry’s Additional Submission dated 10 Aug. 2015, ¶ 9.

<sup>8</sup> Declaration ¶ 152. (Emphasis added.)

<sup>9</sup> *See* Declaration, Heading IV.C(1) and paragraphs 84–89, 100–01, 106, 110, 122, 124.

<sup>10</sup> *See* Declaration ¶ 152 (“There has been no implicit foundation or hint one way or another regarding the substance of the decisions of ICANN staff or the EIU in the Panel majority’s approach.”).

help but think that the implicit foundation for the Declaration's entire analysis is that ICANN staff and the EIU committed violations of the Articles and Bylaws which, in turn, should have triggered a more vigorous review process by the ICANN Board in response to Dot Registry's Reconsideration Request.

7. In my view, my co-Panelists have disregarded the express scope of their review as circumscribed by Article IV.3.4 of ICANN's Bylaws, which focuses solely on the ICANN Board and not on ICANN staff or the EIU:

*Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel"), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:*

- a. *did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?*
- b. *did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and*
- c. *did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?*

(Emphasis added.)

8. ***Third***, in concluding that "the actions and inactions of the Board were inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws,"<sup>11</sup> the Declaration has effectively rewritten ICANN's governing documents and unreasonably elevated the organization's obligations to act transparently and to exercise due diligence and care above any other competing principle or policy. Tensions exist among ICANN's "Core Values." Article I.2 of ICANN's Bylaws states: "Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values."
9. The Declaration recognizes that the "transparency commitments included in the Core Values found in Bylaws, Art. I, § 2 are part of a balancing process," but it goes on to state, in the context of discussing communications over which ICANN claimed legal privilege, that "the obligations in the Bylaws to make [] staff work public are compulsory, not optional, and do not provide for any balancing process."<sup>12</sup> This analysis is misguided. To begin with, Bylaws Article I.2 ("Core Values") concludes thus:

*These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that*

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<sup>11</sup> Declaration ¶ 151.

<sup>12</sup> See Declaration ¶¶ 149–50.

*they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, **situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible.** Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values. (Emphasis added.)*

Moreover, the cited provisions are in no way “compulsory.” Article IV.2.11 states that “the [BCG] **may** ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter, which comments shall be made available on the Website [of ICANN],” and Article IV.2.14 provides that “The [BCG] shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by . . . the ICANN staff . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus if the BGC chooses not to “ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter,” no such views become part of the “public written record.” The BGC is not mandated to inquire of the ICANN staff, and there is no indication in the record of the proceedings before the BGC, or in the present proceeding, that the BGC exercised its discretion in that regard. All four of the items listed on ICANN’s privilege log addressed to the BGC that the Declaration cites were originated by attorneys. Furthermore, the Declaration itself in paragraph 150 records that “it is beyond doubt that the BGC obtained and relied upon information and views **submitted** by ICANN staff,” not solicited by the BGC. (Emphasis added.)

10. The Declaration otherwise disregards any “balance among competing values” and focuses myopically on transparency and due diligence while ignoring the fact that ICANN may have been promoting competing values when its Board denied Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests. For example:

- ICANN was “[p]reserving and enhancing [its] operational stability [and] reliability” by denying meritless Reconsideration Requests. **(Core Value 1)**
- ICANN was “delegating coordination functions” to relevant third-party contractors (the EIU) and also to ICANN staff in assisting with the Determination on the Reconsideration Requests. **(Core Value 3)**
- ICANN was “[i]ntroducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names” because there are collectively 21 other competing applications for the three gTLDs in question. **(Core Value 6)**
- ICANN was “[a]cting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet” because it dealt with meritless Reconsideration Requests in an expedient manner. **(Core Value 9)**

11. ***Fourth***, Dot Registry has gone to great lengths to frame this IRP as an “all or nothing” endeavor, repeatedly reminding the Panel that no appeal shall follow the IRP.<sup>13</sup> Under the guise of protecting its rights, Dot Registry has attempted to expand the scope of the IRP, and, in my view, has abused the process at each step of the way. For example:

- Dot Registry submitted four fact witness statements<sup>14</sup> and a 96-page expert report to reargue the merits of its CPE Applications,<sup>15</sup> none of which were submitted with Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests to the BGC, even though Article IV.2.7 of ICANN’s Bylaws permitted Dot Registry to “submit [with its Reconsideration Requests already] all documentary evidence necessary to demonstrate why the action or inaction should be reconsidered, without limitation.”
- Dot Registry insisted that it be allowed to file a 75-page written submission despite the requirement set forth in Article 5 of ICANN’s Supplementary Procedures that “initial written submissions of the parties [in an IRP] shall not exceed 25 pages each in argument, double-spaced and in 12-point font.”<sup>16</sup>
- Dot Registry filed a 70-page written submission in response to limited procedural questions posed by the Panel, using the opportunity to reargue at great length the merits of the proceeding despite the Panel’s warning that “submissions be focused, succinct, and not repeat matters already addressed.”<sup>17</sup>
- Dot Registry requested that the Panel hold an in-person, five-day hearing even though Article IV.3.12 of ICANN’s Bylaws directs IRP Panels to “conduct [their] proceedings by email and otherwise via the Internet to the maximum extent feasible” and Article 4 of ICANN’s Supplementary Procedures refers to in-person hearings as “extraordinary.”<sup>18</sup>
- Dot Registry introduced a fact witness to testify at the hearing<sup>19</sup> in plain violation of Article IV.3.12 of ICANN’s Bylaws (“the hearing shall be limited to argument only”), paragraph 2 of the Panel’s Procedural Order No. 11 (“There will be no live percipient or expert witness testimony of any kind permitted at the hearing. Nor may a party attempt to produce new or additional evidence.”), and paragraph 2 of the Panel’s Procedural Order No. 12 (same).

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<sup>13</sup> See, e.g., Dot Registry’s Additional Submission dated 13 July 2015, ¶ 4.

<sup>14</sup> See Witness Statement of Elaine F. Marshall dated 17 Apr. 2015; Witness Statement of Jeffrey W. Bullock dated 24 Apr. 2015; Witness Statement of Shaul Jolles dated 13 July 2015; and Witness Statement of Tess Pattison-Wade dated 13 July 2015.

<sup>15</sup> See Expert Report of Michael A. Flynn dated 13 July 2015.

<sup>16</sup> See Letter from Dot Registry to the Panel dated 17 Feb. 2015, at 4.

<sup>17</sup> See Submission of Dot Registry, LLC on the Law Applicable to ICANN and the Structure of the IRP Proceedings dated 12 Oct. 2015 (see especially paragraphs 29–54); Procedural Order No. 6 dated 26 Aug. 2015, ¶ 2.

<sup>18</sup> See Letter from Dot Registry to the Panel dated 17 Feb. 2015, at 6.

<sup>19</sup> See Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 37–42.

12. The Panel has been extremely generous in accommodating Dot Registry's procedural requests, most of which, in my view, fall outside the purview of an IRP. The Declaration loses sight of this context, and ironically the core principle underlying the Declaration's analysis is that Dot Registry has been *deprived of due process and procedural safeguards*. I vigorously disagree. Dot Registry has been afforded every fair opportunity to "skip to the front of the line" of competing applicants and obtain the special privilege of operating three community-based gTLDs. Its claims should be denied. The denial would not take Dot Registry out of contention for the gTLDs, but, as the Declaration correctly acknowledges, would merely place Dot Registry "in a contention set for each of the proposed gTLDs with [all of the other 21 competing] applicants who had applied for one or more of the proposed gTLDs."<sup>20</sup> In this respect, I find the Declaration disturbing insofar as it encourages future disappointed applicants to abuse the IRP system.

\* \* \*

13. Turning to the merits of the dispute, the Declaration determines that ICANN failed to apply the proper standards in ruling on Dot Registry's Reconsideration Requests, and it concludes that the actions and inactions of the ICANN Board violated ICANN's Articles and Bylaws in four respects. I would note that Dot Registry did not specifically ask this Panel to assess whether or not the BGC applied the proper standard of review when evaluating Dot Registry's Reconsideration Requests.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, I believe that the Declaration should not have addressed the BGC's standard of review. As to the four violations, I have grouped them by subject matter ("Discrimination," "Research," "Independent Judgment," and "Privilege") and address each in turn.

### **Discrimination**

14. The Declaration finds that the ICANN Board breached its obligation of due diligence and care, as set forth in Article IV.3.4(b) of the Bylaws, in not having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it concerning whether the EIU or ICANN staff treated Dot Registry's CPE Applications in a discriminatory manner. That is, the ICANN Board should have investigated further into whether the CPE Panels applied an inconsistent scoring approach between Dot Registry's applications and those submitted by other applicants.<sup>22</sup> A critical mistake of the Declaration is its view that Dot Registry, when filing its Reconsideration Requests, actually "complained that the standards applied by the ICANN staff and the EIU to its applications were different from those that the ICANN staff and EIU had applied to other successful applicants."<sup>23</sup> A review of Dot Registry's three Reconsideration Requests

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<sup>20</sup> Declaration ¶ 20.

<sup>21</sup> See Dot Registry's Request for Independent Review Process dated 22 Sept. 2014, ¶ 65; Dot Registry's Additional Written Submission dated 13 July 2015, ¶ 42; Claimant's Post-Hearing Submission dated 8 Apr. 2016, ¶¶ 20-21.

<sup>22</sup> See Declaration ¶¶ 98-100, 103-04, 122.

<sup>23</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 47-48, 124.

filed with the BGC reveals otherwise. In response to issue number 8 on each of the three “Reconsideration Request Forms,” entitled “Detail of Board or Staff Action — Required Information,” Dot Registry listed the alleged bases for reconsideration:

*The inconsistencies with established policies and procedures include: (1) the Panel's failure to properly validate all letters of support and opposition; (2) the Panel's repeated reliance on “research” without disclosure of the source or substance of such research; (3) the Panel's “double counting”; (4) the Panel's apparent evaluation of the [.INC/.LLC/.LLP] Community Application in connection with several other applications submitted by Dot Registry; and (5) the Panel's failure to properly apply the CPE criteria in the AGB in making the Panel Determination.<sup>24</sup>*

15. As can be discerned from Dot Registry’s own submissions, it raised NO allegations concerning discrimination. Paragraph 22 of the Declaration paraphrases the bases for Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests — again, notably NOT including any allegations concerning discrimination — but then the Declaration inexplicably states in paragraph 47 that Dot Registry had alleged “unjustified discrimination (disparate treatment).”
16. My colleagues are mistaken. Dot Registry never asked the BGC for relief on any grounds relating to discrimination. As if Dot Registry’s formal request for relief in its Reconsideration Requests, quoted above, were not clear enough, the remainder of the documents confirms that nowhere did Dot Registry mention or even allude to discrimination. Its Reconsideration Requests do not even use the words “discrimination,” “discriminate,” “discriminatory,” “disparate,” or “unequal.” To the extent that my colleagues take the position that Dot Registry’s discrimination argument was somehow “embedded” within the Reconsideration Requests, I respectfully disagree. At most, Dot Registry referred in passing to an appeals mechanism used in another application (.edu),<sup>25</sup> and it noted, again in passing, that the BGC had ruled a certain way with regard to .MED,<sup>26</sup> but Dot Registry never articulated any proper argument about discrimination. It is undisputed that Dot Registry has alleged discrimination in this IRP<sup>27</sup> — but of course it only raised those arguments after the BGC issued its Determination on Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests. By holding the BGC accountable for failing to act in response to a complaint that Dot Registry never even advanced below, the Declaration commits an obvious error.

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<sup>24</sup> See Reconsideration Request for Application 14-30 at 4; Reconsideration Request for Application 14-32 at 3; Reconsideration Request for Application 14-33 at 3.

<sup>25</sup> See Reconsideration Request for Application 14-30 at 16 & n.39; Reconsideration Request for Application 14-32 at 14 & n.39; Reconsideration Request for Application 14-33 at 14 & n.35.

<sup>26</sup> See Reconsideration Request for Application 14-30 at 6-7; Reconsideration Request for Application 14-32 at 4-5; Reconsideration Request for Application 14-33 at 4-5.

<sup>27</sup> See Dot Registry’s Additional Written Submission dated 17 July 2015, at 15-17; Dot Registry’s Submission dated 12 Oct. 2015, at 27-30.

## Research

17. The Declaration finds that the ICANN Board also breached the same obligation of due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it concerning transparency. More specifically, it concludes that the BGC did not take sufficient steps to see if ICANN staff and the EIU acted transparently when undertaking “research” that went into the CPE Reports.<sup>28</sup> The only references to “research” in the CPE Reports are the same two sentences that are repeated three times verbatim in each of the CPE Reports:

*Research showed that firms are typically organized around specific industries, locales, and other criteria not related to the entities['] structure as an [INC, LLC, LLP]. Based on the Panel's research, there is no evidence of [INCs, LLCs, LLPs] from different sectors acting as a community as defined by the Applicant Guidebook.*<sup>29</sup> (Emphasis added.)

18. The Declaration traces the origins of this language back to correspondence between ICANN staff and the EIU in which the former suggested that the latter refer to “research” in a draft of what would eventually become the final CPE Reports in order to further “substantiate” the conclusion that INCs/LLCs/LLPs do not constitute “communities.”<sup>30</sup> The Declaration observes that Dot Registry had asserted in its Reconsideration Requests that the CPE Reports “repeatedly relie[d]” upon research as a “key factor” without “cit[ing] any sources or giv[ing] any information about [] the substance or the methods or scope of the ‘research.’”<sup>31</sup> My colleagues are troubled by what they view as ICANN’s Board making “short shrift” of Dot Registry’s position concerning the “research.”<sup>32</sup> The BGC disposed of Dot Registry’s argument as follows:

*The Requestor argues that the Panels improperly conducted and relied upon independent research while failing to “cit[e] any sources or give[] any information about [] the substance or the methods or scope of the ‘research.’” As the Requestor acknowledges, Section 4.2.3 of the Guidebook expressly authorizes CPE Panels to “perform independent research, if deemed necessary to reach informed scoring decisions.[”] The Requestor cites to no established policy or procedure (because there is none) requiring a CPE Panel to disclose details regarding the sources, scope, or methods of its independent research. As such, the Requestor’s argument does not support reconsideration.*<sup>33</sup>

19. The Declaration views this analysis by the BGC as insufficient. It concludes that the

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<sup>28</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 94–99, 106, 111, 115–22.

<sup>29</sup> Community Priority Evaluation Report for “INC” dated 11 June 2014, at 2, 3, 4; Community Priority Evaluation Report for “LLC” dated 11 June 2014, at 2, 3, 4; Community Priority Evaluation Report for “LLP” dated 11 June 2014, at 2, 3, 4.

<sup>30</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 96–99.

<sup>31</sup> Declaration ¶ 94 (quoting Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests).

<sup>32</sup> Declaration ¶ 95.

<sup>33</sup> Determination of the Board Governance Committee Reconsideration Request 14-30, 14-32, 14-33 dated 24 July 2014, at 11 (internal citations omitted).



“failure by the BGC to undertake an examination of whether ICANN staff or the EIU in fact complied with those [transparency] obligations is itself a failure by the Board to comply with its [transparency] obligations under the Articles and Bylaws.”<sup>34</sup>

20. The Declaration suffers from several fatal flaws. To begin with, it consists of a thinly veiled rebuke of actions taken by the EIU and ICANN staff. Although the Declaration does not explicitly so state, it hints at a strong disapproval of the cooperation between the EIU and ICANN staff in drafting the CPE Reports, and it all but says that the EIU and ICANN staff violated ICANN’s transparency policies by citing “research” in the CPE Reports but failing to detail the nature of that “research.” As noted above, however, this Panel’s jurisdiction is expressly limited to reviewing the action or inaction of the ICANN Board and no other individual or entity. ICANN itself has recognized that “the only way in which the conduct of ICANN staff or third parties is reviewable [by an IRP Panel] is to the extent that the Board allegedly breached ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws in acting (or failing to act) with respect to that conduct.”<sup>35</sup> In my opinion, my co-Panelists’ conclusion that ICANN’s Board breached its Articles and Bylaws is driven by their firm belief that ICANN staff and the EIU should have disclosed their research. This reasoning places the “cart before the horse” and fails on that basis alone.
21. Nor has the Declaration given proper consideration to the BGC’s analysis (quoted in paragraph 18 above) or to ICANN’s position as articulated in one of its written submissions to this Panel:

*[T]he CPE Panels were not required to perform any particular research, much less the precise research preferred by an applicant. Rather, the Guidebook leaves the issue of what research, if any, to perform to the discretion of the CPE panel: “The panel may also perform independent research, if deemed necessary to reach informed scoring decisions.”*

*[T]he research performed by the EIU is not transmitted to ICANN, and would not have been produced in this IRP because it is not in ICANN’s custody, possession, or control. The BGC would not need this research in order to determine if the EIU had complied with the relevant policies and procedures (the only issue for the BGC to assess with respect to Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests).<sup>36</sup>*

Moreover, as noted in paragraph 5 above, it was reasonable for the BGC not to exercise its discretion to inquire into the details of the EIU’s research, given the rather obvious absence of merit in Dot Registry’s CPE submissions for .INC, .LLC, and .LLP.

22. Had my co-Panelists fully considered the BGC’s Determination on the Reconsideration Requests and ICANN’s analysis, they would have found that both withstand scrutiny. Section 4.2.3 of the AGB establishes a CPE Panel’s right — but not obligation — to perform

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<sup>34</sup> Declaration ¶ 122.

<sup>35</sup> ICANN’s Response to Claimant Dot Registry LLC’s Additional Submission dated 10 Aug. 2015, ¶ 10.

<sup>36</sup> See ICANN’s Response to Claimant Dot Registry LLC’s Additional Submission dated 10 Aug. 2015, ¶ 44 (citing AGB § 4.2.3) (emphasis in original).

research, which it “deem[s] necessary to reach [an] informed scoring decision.” The Declaration effectively transforms that discretionary right into an affirmative obligation to produce any research performed by any ICANN personnel or even by third parties such as the EIU. The Declaration cites for support general provisions concerning transparency that, it says, “reverberate[] through [ICANN’s] Articles and Bylaws,”<sup>37</sup> but it notably fails to cite any clause specifically requiring the disclosure of “research.” There is no such clause. ICANN, its staff, and its third-party vendors should not be penalized for having exercised the right to perform research when they were never required to do so in the first place. I disagree with the Declaration which forces the BGC to “police” any voluntary research performed by ICANN staff or the EIU and spell out the details of that research for all unsuccessful CPE applicants during the reconsideration process.

23. In any event, any reader of the underlying CPE Reports rejecting Dot Registry’s applications would be hard pressed to find that the reasoning and conclusions expressed in those reports would no longer hold up if the two sentences referring to “research” had never appeared in those reports. My colleagues are fooling themselves if they think that extracting those ancillary references to “research” from the CPE Reports would have meant that the CPE Panels would have awarded Dot Registry with four points for “Community Establishment.” Any error relating to the disclosure of that research was harmless at best.

### **Independent Judgment**

24. The Declaration cites Article IV.3.4(c) of ICANN’s Bylaws, which instructs IRP Panels to focus on, *inter alia*, whether “the Board members exercise[d] independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company.”<sup>38</sup> It finds that “the record makes it exceedingly difficult to conclude that the BGC exercised independent judgment.”<sup>39</sup> Besides the text of the BGC’s Determination on the Reconsideration Requests and the minutes of the BGC meeting held concerning that determination, which my co-Panelists dismiss as “*pro forma*” and “routine boilerplate,” the Declaration finds nothing to support the conclusion that the BGC did anything more than “rubber stamp” work supplied by ICANN staff.<sup>40</sup> The Declaration chastises ICANN for submitting “no witness statements or testimony” or documents to prove that its Board acted independently.<sup>41</sup> In response to an assertion from ICANN’s counsel that the Board did not rely on staff recommendations, the Declaration retorts, “[That] is simply not credible.”<sup>42</sup> Ultimately, it holds ICANN in violation of Article IV.3.4(c) on the basis that ICANN presented “no real evidence” that the BGC exercised independent judgment.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> See Declaration ¶¶ 117–21.

<sup>38</sup> Declaration ¶ 126.

<sup>39</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 127, 147.

<sup>40</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 126, 140, 147.

<sup>41</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 127, 147.

<sup>42</sup> Declaration ¶ 141.

<sup>43</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 126, 147, 150.

25. The Declaration<sup>44</sup> relies heavily on Articles IV.2.11 and IV.2.14 of ICANN's Bylaws which state:

*The Board Governance Committee may ask the ICANN staff for its views on the matter, which comments shall be made publicly available on the Website.*

*The Board Governance Committee shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the public written record, including information submitted by the party seeking reconsideration or review, by the ICANN staff, and by any third party.*

26. The Declaration interprets these Articles by finding that the "obligations in the Bylaws to make . . . staff work public are compulsory, not optional."<sup>45</sup>
27. Once again, the Declaration elevates the mantra of transparency above all else. It is worth recalling, as is set forth in paragraph 9 above, that Article IV.2.11 vests in the BGC the right — but not the obligation — to seek staff views. ICANN has explained that there are no records of "staff . . . views" or "information submitted . . . by the ICANN staff," as contemplated by Articles IV.2.11 and IV.2.14. It should be noted that the privilege log submitted by ICANN does show that there were 14 e-mail exchanges between ICANN officials and their counsel relating to Dot Registry, which controverts the "rubber-stamping" conclusion of the Declaration.<sup>46</sup> ICANN's Senior Counsel has even gone so far as to submit a signed, notarized attestation (albeit after being compelled to do so by the Panel)<sup>47</sup> that ICANN had produced all non-privileged documents in its possession responding to the Panel's inquiries concerning ICANN's internal communications.<sup>48</sup> The Panel, nonetheless, deems ICANN's position "simply not credible."<sup>49</sup> Credibility determinations have no place in this IRP, especially in relation to counsel.<sup>50</sup> The Declaration has effectively gutted the meaning of Articles IV.2.11 and IV.2.14 as discretionary tools available to ICANN and converted them into affirmative obligations that ICANN produce enough evidence in an IRP to prove that its Board acted independently.
28. Curiously, the Declaration refers not even once to "burden of proof." It was wise not to do so, notwithstanding that both Dot Registry and ICANN contended that the other Party bore a burden of proof, given that nowhere in the Bylaws relating to the BGC or to this IRP is there

<sup>44</sup> See Declaration ¶¶ 128, 142, 149–50.

<sup>45</sup> Declaration ¶ 149.

<sup>46</sup> See Privilege Log (attached to Letter from ICANN to the Panel dated 19 June 2015).

<sup>47</sup> See Procedural Order No. 6 dated 12 June 2015, ¶ 4.

<sup>48</sup> See Attestation of Elizabeth Le dated 17 June 2015.

<sup>49</sup> Declaration ¶ 151.

<sup>50</sup> Note that the Declaration also repeatedly refers to the "Declaration" submitted by EIU Contact Information Redacted on behalf of ICANN as evidence showing that ICANN staff worked closely with the EIU. See Declaration ¶¶ 14, 15, 36, 43, 90–92. EIU Contact Information Redacted did not submit a traditional "witness statement." He is the EIU Contact Information Redacted of the EIU. He wrote one five-page declaration dated 13 April 2015 that was submitted by ICANN to Dot Registry as part of the document-production process in this dispute.

any provision for a burden of proof. To the contrary, the present IRP is governed by Bylaws Article IV.3.4, which prescribes that this Panel “shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board [BGC] to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of [them].” Nevertheless, it is self-evident that the Declaration not only placed the burden on ICANN to prove that its Board acted independently, but the Declaration’s repeated references to the “silence in the evidentiary record”<sup>51</sup> make it clear that the Declaration viewed ICANN’s failure to submit evidence as *the single decisive factor* behind its holding. None of the previous IRP panels has placed the burden on ICANN to disprove a claimant’s case.<sup>52</sup> Why would they? Guided by the mandate of Bylaws Article IV.3.4, the Panel should simply have taken the record before it, compared it to the requirements of the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws, weighed the record and the Parties’ arguments, and then, without imposing any burden of proof on either Party, have proceeded to its decision.

29. Applying that approach to this particular dispute should have led the Panel to the two most obvious pieces of evidence on point: the 23-page Determination on the Reconsideration Requests and the minutes of the Board meeting during which its members voted on that Determination. In my view, the 23-page Determination on the Reconsideration Requests is thorough and sufficient in and of itself to show that the ICANN Board fully and independently considered Dot Registry’s claims. Each argument advanced by Dot Registry was carefully recorded, analyzed, dissected, and rejected. What more could be necessary? Another IRP Panel, deciding the dispute in *Vistaprint Limited v. ICANN*, apparently agreed. It stated:

*In contrast to Vistaprint's claim that the BGC failed to perform its task properly and “turned a blind eye to the appointed Panel's lack of independence and impartiality”, the IRP Panel finds that the BGC provided in its 19-page decision a detailed analysis of (i) the allegations concerning whether the ICDR violated its processes or procedures governing the SCO proceedings and the appointment of, and challenges to, the experts, and (ii) the questions regarding whether the Third Expert properly applied the burden of proof and the substantive standard for evaluating a String Confusion Objection. On these points, the IRP Panel finds that the BGC's analysis shows serious consideration of the issues raised by Vistaprint and, to an important degree, reflects the IRP Panel's own analysis.*<sup>53</sup>

30. The minutes of the ICANN Board meeting held on 24 July 2014 also show that “[a]fter discussion and consideration of the Request, the BGC concluded that the Requester has failed to demonstrate that the CPE Panels acted in contravention of established policy or procedure in rendering their Reports.”<sup>54</sup> The Declaration summarily dismisses those

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<sup>51</sup> Declaration ¶ 128.

<sup>52</sup> See Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 91:8–18, 174:14–19.

<sup>53</sup> *Vistaprint Limited v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 01-14-0000-6505, Final Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, ¶ 159.

<sup>54</sup> See <https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/minutes-bgc-2014-07-24-en>.

minutes as “boilerplate” and “*pro forma*.”<sup>55</sup> Here, too, the Declaration is mistaken. It is to be appreciated that the minutes only go into minimal detail, but the Declaration fails to accord any meaning or weight whatsoever to the words “discussion and consideration.” The words must mean what they say: ICANN’s Board “discussed” and “considered” Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests and decided to deny them for all of the reasons set forth in the Determination on the Reconsideration Requests.

31. To accept the analysis set forth in the Declaration, one must start from the premise that ICANN’s Board Members had to “wrestle” with difficult issues raised by Dot Registry’s Reconsideration Requests and therefore a long paper trail must exist reflecting inquiries, discussions, drafts, and so forth. A sober review of the record, however, suggests that the Board never needed to engage in any prolonged deliberations, because it was never a “close call.” Dot Registry’s CPE applications only received 5 out of 16 points (far short of the 14 points necessary to prevail), and its Reconsideration Requests largely reargued the merits of its underlying CPE Applications. The ICANN Board assessed and denied Dot Registry’s weak applications with efficiency. It should have no obligation to detail its work beyond that which it has done.
  
32. Instead of doing as it should have done, however, and in addition to converting discretionary powers of the BGC under the Bylaws into unperformed mandatory investigations, the Panel engaged in repeated speculation in paragraph after paragraph: it “infer[red],” para. 133; “presume[d],” para. 133; stated that “it would appear,” para. 134; “consider[ed],” para. 137; found that since “[n]o ICANN staff or Board members presented a witness statement in this proceeding,” and there is “no documentary evidence of such a hypothetical discussion,” i.e., “oral conversations between staff and members of the BGC, and among members of the BGC, . . . in connection with the July 24 session BGC meeting where the BGC determined to deny the reconsideration requests,” . . . “no evidence at all exists [‘apart from *pro forma* corporate minutes of the BGC meeting’] to support a conclusion that the BGC did more than just accept without critical review the recommendations and draft decisions of ICANN staff,” para. 140; found that “[t]he BGC . . . simply could not have reached its decision to deny the Reconsideration Requests without relying on work of ICANN staff,” para. 145; and concluded that “ICANN has not submitted any *evidence* to allow the Panel to objectively and independently determine whether references in the Minutes to discussion by the BGC of the Requests are anything more than corporate counsel’s routine boilerplate drafting for the Minutes . . . regardless of whether or not the discussion was more than rubber-stamping of management decisions,” para. 147. (Emphasis in original.)

### **Privilege**

33. Related to the last issue and relying once more on its mistaken interpretation of Articles IV.2.11 and IV.2.14 of ICANN’s Bylaws when viewed in combination as mandating public posting of unsolicited comments from ICANN staff, the Declaration finds that the ICANN

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<sup>55</sup> Declaration ¶ 147.

Board breached its obligation to make ICANN staff work publicly available by claiming legal privilege over communications involving ICANN's Office of General Counsel.<sup>56</sup> It is undisputed that ICANN submitted a three-page privilege log, listing 14 documents, and ICANN's counsel did not hide the fact that ICANN had withheld from its productions those communications concerning Dot Registry that involved ICANN's Office of General Counsel.<sup>57</sup>

34. The question for the Panel is whether ICANN's transparency obligations, particularly those found in the provisions quoted at paragraph 25 above, even as wrongly interpreted by the majority Declaration, prohibited ICANN from claiming legal privilege over communications otherwise reflecting ICANN staff views on Dot Registry's Reconsideration Requests. ICANN's Bylaws could have included limiting language recognizing that ICANN's obligations under Articles IV.2.11 and IV.2.14 to make staff work available to the public would be subject to legal privilege, but the Bylaws do not do so. On the other hand, neither do the Bylaws expressly state that ICANN's transparency obligations trump ICANN's right to communicate confidentially with its counsel, as any other California corporation is entitled to do.<sup>58</sup> Article III of ICANN's Bylaws, entitled "Transparency," does not specifically answer the question before the Panel. My colleagues rely heavily on the first provision of the Article, which states that "ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner." My colleagues do not cite the only provision found within Article III that does address "legal matters," albeit in the context of Board resolutions and meeting minutes, which suggests that ICANN's general transparency obligations do NOT trump its right to withhold legally privileged communications.<sup>59</sup> As such, I would not have found ICANN in violation of its Bylaws but I would have favored a Declaration adopting an approach similar to that taken recently by another IRP Panel, *Despegar v. ICANN*, in which the Panel rejected all of the claims brought by the claimants but suggested that ICANN's Board address an issue outside of the IRP context.<sup>60</sup> This Panel just as easily could have urged ICANN to clarify how legal privilege fits within its transparency obligations without granting Dot Registry's applications in this IRP.

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<sup>56</sup> Declaration ¶¶ 133, 135-37, 143, 148-50.

<sup>57</sup> Declaration ¶ 141. The Declaration suggests that ICANN has raised both attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege, *see* Declaration ¶¶ 128 and 149, although the last column in ICANN's privilege log lists "attorney-client privilege" as the only applicable privilege to each document listed.

<sup>58</sup> *See* Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 211:17-24.

<sup>59</sup> *See* ICANN Bylaws, Article III.5.2 ("[A]ny resolutions passed by the Board of Directors at [a] meeting shall be made publicly available on the Website; provided, however, that any actions relating to . . . legal matters (to the extent the Board determines it is necessary or appropriate to protect the interests of ICANN) . . . are not appropriate for public distribution, [and] shall not be included in the preliminary report made publicly available."); ICANN Bylaws, Article III.5.4 (same regarding meeting minutes).

<sup>60</sup> *Despegar SRL Online v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 01-15-0002-8061, Final Declaration ¶¶ 144, 157-58 ("[A] number of the more general issues raised by the Claimants and, indeed, some of the statements made by ICANN at the hearing, give the Panel cause for concern, which it wishes to record here and to which it trusts the ICANN Board will give due consideration.").

## Conclusion

35. In my view Dot Registry, apparently with the collaboration of the National Association of Secretaries of State (“NASS”), has quite boldly gamed the system, seeking CPEs which all of the other 21 applicants for the three gTLDs in issue thought were obviously unattainable, since they ventured no such applications, in hopes of outflanking, hence defeating, all of them by bulldozing ICANN in the present proceeding. As noted above, the majority Declaration entirely overlooks the fact that the BGC was empowered, but not required, by the rules governing its proceeding to make certain inquiries, and takes no account of how the exercise of the BGC’s discretion in this regard can legitimately be affected by the patent lack of any kind of “community” among all INCs, LLCs, or LLPs. At the hearing I questioned whether the willingness of the NASS to support Dot Registry in its gamble might not be due to its members’ independent interest in the possibility that their enforcement function would be facilitated if Dot Registry’s applications were to be successful:

*JUDGE BROWER: ... Suppose I'm the secretary of state of Delaware or the head of the NASS, and your client comes to me with his proposition of the applications that have been put before us. And the secretary of state says, oh, wow, this is a great enforcement possibility for us. If you get these domain names approved by ICANN and a provision of being able to use it is that one is registered with the secretary of state of one of the states, that's for me, wow, what a great sort of enforcement surveillance mechanism, because I don't have to pay anything for it. It's better than anything we've been able to do, because I will know anyone using the LLC or LLP or INC as a domain name actually has legitimate -- should have a legitimate legal status. So that's my motive, okay? I'll do anything I can to get that done, and he says, sure, I'll sign anything. I'll say they got it all wrong. Does that make -- would that make any difference?*

*MR. ALI: I mean I wouldn't want to speak for the Delaware secretary of state or any other secretary of state. I think that's precisely the sort of question that you could have put to them if they were in front of you. I mean what their motivations were or what their motivations are, I think it would be highly inappropriate for me to try and get. I would not want to offer you any sort of speculation, but I would say that the obverse of not having that I would say surveillance power, they have that anyway if you want to call it surveillance, because the registration, "surveillance" sounds somewhat sinister, particularly in today's environment of being someone who has some background. So I would simply say that the -- by not having this particular institution as we proposed by Dot Registry, the prospects of consumer fraud and abuse are absolutely massive, because if somebody were to gain the rights to these TLDs, or maybe it's not just one company or one applicant, but three different applicants, not a single one of which is based in the United States, just think of the prospect of a company registered who knows where, representing to the world that it's an INC. That would be highly problematic. That would be -- that would create the potential for significant consumer fraud. I mean consumer fraud on the internet is multibillion dollar*

*liability. This stands, if it's not done properly, to create absolute havoc. And so the secretary of state, in his or her execution of his or her mission, might well be motivated by wanting to prevent further consumer fraud, but that's an entirely legitimate purpose. That's really my own speculation.*

*JUDGE BROWER: No, I don't argue with the legitimate purpose. The question is whether it is a basis of community.<sup>61</sup>*

I believe that this exchange speaks for itself.

36. The majority Declaration unilaterally reforms the entire BGC procedure for addressing Reconsideration Requests and also what heretofore has been expected of an IRP Panel. The majority would have done better to stick to the rules itself, and, as the IRP Panel did in *Despegar v. ICANN*, suggest that the ICANN Board “give due consideration” to general issues of concern raised by the Claimant.<sup>62</sup> The present Declaration, in finding the BGC guilty of violating the ICANN Articles and By-Laws, has itself violated them.
37. The majority Declaration intentionally avoids any recommendations to the Board as to how it should respond to this Declaration. This IRP Panel is, of course, empowered to make recommendations to the Board.<sup>63</sup> Since the Declaration, if it is to be given effect, has simply concluded that the BGC violated transparency, did not have before it all of the facts necessary to make a decision, and failed to act independently — all procedural defects having nothing to do with the merits of Dot Registry’s three applications for CPEs — it appears to me that the only remedy that would do justice to Dot Registry, as the majority Declaration sees it, and also to all of the other 21 applicants for the same three gTLDs, hence to ICANN itself, would be for the Board to “consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting,” as it is required to do under Article IV.3.21 of the Bylaws, and for the BGC to take whatever “subsequent action on th[e] declaration[.]” it deems necessary in light of the findings of the Declaration.<sup>64</sup> In other words, I would recommend that the Board, at most, request the BGC to rehear the original Reconsideration Requests of Dot Registry, making the inquiries and requiring the production of the evidence the majority Declaration has found wanting. Considering the limits of the Declaration, which has not touched on the merits of Dot Registry’s three CPE applications, it would, in my view, be wholly inappropriate for the Board to grant Dot Registry’s request that its three applications now be approved without further ado.
38. For all of the above-mentioned reasons, I would have rejected each of Dot Registry’s claims and named ICANN as the prevailing party. I respectfully dissent.

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<sup>61</sup> Hearing Transcript dated 29 Mar. 2016, at 65:6-67:23.

<sup>62</sup> *Despegar SRL Online v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 01-15-0002-8061, Final Declaration ¶¶ 144, 157–58.

<sup>63</sup> ICANN Bylaws, Article IV.3.11(d) (“The IRP Panel shall have the authority to: ... recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.”); ICANN Bylaws, Article IV.3.21 (“Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting. The declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.”).

<sup>64</sup> ICANN Bylaws, Article IV.3.21.



29 July 2016

*Charles N. Brower*

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